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ABSTRACT 
This study is comprised of two parts. Part 1 focuses on ISIS, Boko Haram, and 
Al-Shabaab, examining the structures, tactics, and motivations of the groups. Each group 
seeks territory in its respective region. After losing territories, Boko Haram and Al-
Shabaab both turned to guerilla attacks and suicide bombing, destabilizing the areas 
formerly under their control. Having lost much territory, ISIS is already showing signs of 
behaving more like an insurgency and employing tactics similar to Boko Haram and Al-
Shabaab by resorting to attacks on soft targets as it continues to be deprived of territory. 
Part 2 focuses on the US policy response to ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab. After 
describing the Obama Administration’s objectives, polices, and results against these 
groups, this study concludes that while President Obama’s objectives were met fairly 
well and the groups were weakened in territorial capacity, the groups continue to thrive in 
certain capacities and the administration failed to deter the groups’ escalating soft target 
attacks. In detailing and speculating upon the Trump Administration’s policies towards 
ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab, this study predicts the Trump Administration’s 
potential departures from the previous administration and highlights the opportunities and 
challenges confronting President Trump in countering the groups. This study finds that 
the Trump Administration will likely increase US troop levels in the fights against ISIS, 
Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab, and that sustaining gains against the groups will 
necessitate a long-term US role of security and surveillance in areas vulnerable to the 
groups’ attacks.   
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Review of Sources 
 
The use of open-source data in this study is intentional so the sources are widely 
available. The plurality of these sources is online news reporting due to the recent and 
ongoing nature of this study’s subject. Because this study uses so many news sources that 
can be found and read quickly and easily, a simple review of the source material as 
opposed to a full literature review is sufficient. A few of the news websites often cited are 
The New York Times, The Washington Post, and BBC. Other cited websites are devoted 
to the study of terrorist groups and national security, such as the Council on Foreign 
Relations, Brookings, and Stanford websites; these sources provide unrivaled information 
on the background and history of the jihadist organizations analyzed in this study. Cited 
online magazines like Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, and The Atlantic are sources that 
present analysis on the developments and trends of the groups studied. The one book 
cited in this study is ISIS: The State of Terror by Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, which 
profiles the progress of ISIS. This study sometimes cites academic publications, which 
provide deep analysis into jihadist groups. This study has multiple US government 
sources including The White House website, Defense Department and State Department 
websites, and Congressional testimony, which display specific objectives, policies, and 
opinions of the US government. The cited Congressional Research Service publications 
provide comprehensive information and analysis on jihadist groups and US policies.  
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Methodology 
 
 The research focus of this study is ISIS, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, and the US 
response to these groups. The research question is what the future behaviors of these 
groups will look like and how best the US can respond to the groups. This study collects 
open-source data including news websites, academic publications, and US government 
sources. Media publications were utilized and assessed to present an overview of the 
issues from the perspective of open-source analysis. The study is therefore largely 
informational, although a significant portion involves original analysis based on open-
source data. This thesis is based on a research style used in the intelligence field that 
assesses ongoing events. In open-source intelligence analysis, analysts rely on the 
availability of news publications to update their work and make assessments. An aspect 
of this is to understand the analysis of journalists and academics. Combining their 
reporting and analysis with this study’s original analysis allows for an expanded 
viewpoint and a variety of perspectives. Part 1 evaluates data with an intelligence 
analysis approach, looking at certain trends of behavior and tactics in order to make 
predictions. Part 2 analyzes data with more of a policy analysis approach, looking at the 
objectives and results of policies and drawing conclusions on potential successes and 
errors based on the factors on the ground.      
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Part 1: ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab 
 
 The first part of this study analyzes ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab, and 
assesses future behavior. Specifically, Part 1 looks at the structure, history, status, 
ideology, and tactics of each group. The structures of the organizations reveal the key 
aspects that influence operations and group capacities. By analyzing the history and 
status of each group, one can better understand not only past behavior but also future 
actions. Studying each group’s ideology aids the comprehension of the root causes 
behind certain notions, objectives of the groups, and how they justify their actions. In 
analyzing tactics, this study details the development of strategy for each group and how it 
has evolved. From that, this study identifies the trends of these tactics and predicts how 
the groups will act in the months and years ahead. Part 1 focuses its predictions on ISIS, 
as it presents perhaps the largest national security threat of the three groups and has 
received considerable attention in the US, especially in the realm of US counterterrorism 
policy, the subject of Part 2 of this study.   
 Although al Qaeda and certain other jihadist organizations are significant threats 
with many ties and similarities to these groups, this study singularly focuses on ISIS, 
Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab. All three groups are inspired by Salafi-jihadism and have 
roots in al Qaeda, but are unique among jihadist groups in prioritizing the control of 
territory in their respective regions. Additionally, this study mostly focuses on the 
activities of these terrorist groups in Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, and Somalia. While these 
groups are active in other regions, these countries are relevant because the groups 
controlled territories within them and the groups’ tactics are most prevalent within them.   
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ISIS 
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also commonly known as ISIL, the 
Islamic State, or Daesh, is a Sunni jihadist organization that is rooted in an extremist 
group founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999. In 2004, this group became an al 
Qaeda splinter group, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The United States (US) State Department 
designated it as a terrorist organization in 2004.1 AQI separated from al Qaeda after al-
Zarqawi was killed in 2006, forming the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). After entering the 
Syrian Civil War, ISI proclaimed itself ISIS.2 By 2013, the group was conducting dozens 
of deadly attacks a month inside Iraq and starting operations in Syria. After capturing 
vast areas of territory in both Iraq and Syria in 2014, ISIS declared the establishment of a 
caliphate. The group has shepherded recruits from around the world into Iraq and Syria, 
mobilized affiliates in multiple other countries, and inspired many radicalized followers. 
Since 2015, ISIS and ISIS-inspired individuals have carried out a wave of terrorist attacks 
that claimed hundreds of lives on four continents.3 
Structure  
ISIS has a detailed structure and hierarchy. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi is the 
proclaimed caliph and leader of ISIS and has supreme political and religious authority in 
ISIS territory. He has two deputies, one in charge of the administration of Iraq4 and 
another in charge of Syria. Below the deputies are the Shura Council, the Cabinet, and 
local leaders. ISIS fighters from foreign countries hold many of the top administrative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 "Senior Administration Officials on Terrorist Designations of the al-Nusrah Front as an Alias for al-Qaida 
in Iraq," U.S. Department of State, December 11, 2012, Accessed March 24, 2017, https://2009-
2 Jessica Stern and J.M Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, London: William Collins, 2016. 
3 Christopher M. Blanchard and Carla E. Humud, “The Islamic State and U.S. Policy,” Congressional 
Research Service, Cong. Rept. January 18, 2017. 
4Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham," Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi,. 
Accessed March 24, 2017, http://www.aymennjawad.org/14151/the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham. 	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posts in the bureaucracy. The Shura Council has the power to depose the caliph, but al 
Baghdadi appoints all Council members.5 
ISIS rules by Sharia law and does not recognize international borders. When ISIS 
takes control of a city or province, it uses violent tactics to enforce fundamentalist 
Islamism. ISIS governs its territories, having created court systems, schools, social 
services, and local governments.6 ISIS established a police force to enforce the religious 
doctrine of the state, ensuring shops are closed during Muslim prayer and that women 
cover their hair and faces in public. If the police find someone defying these standards, 
then that person will be publicly executed or amputated.7 Other forms of punishment for 
violators of these standards include lashing (whipping) and stoning (throwing stones at 
the violator).8     
History and Status 
After invading Iraq in 2003, the US disbanded Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army and 
banned the Ba’ath Party, the dominant party in Iraqi government. This process, called de-
Ba’athification, blocked many experienced people from participating in the new 
government and therefore alienated many people. This alienation led some former 
Ba’athists to turn to insurgency and eventually ISIS.9 Many of the leaders of ISIS were 
officers in Saddam Hussein’s dissolved army who combined their military training with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Cameron Glenn, "Al Qaeda v ISIS: Leaders & Structure," Wilson Center, March 14, 2016. Accessed 
March 24, 2017, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/al-qaeda-v-isis-leaders-structure. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Gregor Aisch, "How ISIS Works," The New York Times, September 16, 2014, Accessed March 24, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/16/world/middleeast/how-isis-works.html. 
8 Cameron Glenn, "Al Qaeda v ISIS: Leaders & Structure," Wilson Center, March 14, 2016. Accessed 
March 24, 2017, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/al-qaeda-v-isis-leaders-structure. 
9 Mark Thompson, "ISIS: How Disbanding the Iraqi Army Fueled the Extremist Group's Rise," Time, May 
28, 2015, Accessed March 24, 2017, http://time.com/3900753/isis-iraq-syria-army-united-states-military/. 	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insurgency methods during years of battling American forces.10 The Institute for the 
Study of War analyzed the operations of ISIS from November 2012 to November 2013 
and concluded that ISIS functioned as a military rather than a terrorist network, most 
likely due to the influence of these officers. Thus, the organization has a military 
framework,11 even as it engages in terrorist activities.        
In 2011, ISIS entered the war against Assad in Syria and, in early 2014, seized 
areas in Iraq. As ISIS captured Mosul and quickly moved south in Iraq, it also seized and 
consolidated control of Raqqa and most of the surrounding area in Syria.12 The group 
draws on resentment of the dominant powers in Iraq and Syria, thriving in Sunni areas 
facing exclusion from the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government and in areas hostile to 
Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite regime.13 It also advanced into Kurdish areas of Iraq, killing 
or enslaving thousands of the Yazidis.14 The group controls hundreds of square miles in 
Iraq and Syria15 and has 12,000 to 15,000 fighters in those countries.16      
According to NBC News, ISIS is operational in eighteen countries throughout the 
Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.17 One critical goal of ISIS is to acquire more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Gregor Aisch, "How ISIS Works," The New York Times, September 16, 2014, Accessed March 24, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/16/world/middleeast/how-isis-works.html. 
11 Robert G. Rabil, Daniel L. Davis, Richard Javad Heydarian, and Douglas Macgregor, "The ISIS 
Chronicles: A History," The National Interest, July 17, 2014. Accessed March 24, 2017, 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-isis-chronicles-history-10895?page=2. 
12 Jessica Stern and J.M Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, London: William Collins, 2016. 
13 Clint Watts, "End Game: Al-Shabab as a Model for the Islamic State's Decline," World Politics Review, 
March 30, 2015, accessed March 25, 2017, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15418/end-game-
al-shabab-as-a-model-for-the-islamic-state-s-decline. 
14 "Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps," BBC News, January 20, 2017, Accessed March 
24, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034. 
15 Christopher M. Blanchard and Carla E. Humud, “The Islamic State and U.S. Policy,” Congressional 
Research Service, Cong. Rept. January 18, 2017. 
16 Associated Press in Washington, "Isis ranks dwindle to 15,000 amid 'retreat on all fronts', claims 
Pentagon," The Guardian, August 10, 2016, Accessed March 24, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/11/isis-ranks-dwindle-to-15000-amid-retreat-on-all-fronts-
claims-pentagon. 
17 William Arkin, Robert Windrem, and Cynthia McFadden, "New 'Heat Map' Shows ISIS Branches 
Spreading Worldwide," NBCNews.com, August 03, 2016, Accessed March 24, 2017, 
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initiates and expand its recruiting efforts around the world. The call for the creation of a 
caliphate inspired a surge in foreign fighters, including from many Western countries, 
travelling to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS. A 2015 report concluded that about 27,000 
foreign jihadists had joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq; more than half of them were from the 
Middle East and North Africa.18   
An example of ISIS expansion is the ISIS presence in Libya. ISIS does not appear 
to have much of an organizational infrastructure in the country, but may have as many as 
6,000 fighters there. The group had a stronghold in the Libyan coastal city of Sirte, but it 
came under siege and ISIS experienced losses in and around the city (facilitated by a US 
military campaign).19 
But even as ISIS expands globally, much of the land it once controlled has been 
taken away. Since the beginning of 2015, ISIS has lost roughly 65% of its acquired 
territory, approximately 60% of its acquired territory in Iraq and 30% in Syria.20 At its 
peak, around ten million people lived in ISIS-controlled territory; today it is estimated 
close to six million.21 
Kurdish-led forces have driven ISIS jihadists out of thousands of square miles in 
Northern Syria. These forces are taking control of cities such as Manbij and Hassadjek 
from ISIS. This has caused ISIS in Al-Bab to start evacuating troops and relocating them 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/new-counterterrorism-heat-map-shows-isis-branches-
spreading-worldwide-n621866. 
18 "Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps," BBC News, January 20, 2017, Accessed March 
24, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034. 
19 Christopher M. Blanchard and Carla E. Humud, “The Islamic State and U.S. Policy,” Congressional 
Research Service, Cong. Rept. January 18, 2017. 
20 Michael R. Gordon, "ISIS Leaders Are Fleeing Raqqa, U.S. Military Says," The New York Times, March 
08, 2017, Accessed March 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/middleeast/syria-raqqa-
isis.html. 
21 "Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps," BBC News, January 20, 2017, Accessed March 
24, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034. 
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to Raqqa.22 Turkey’s armed forces invaded Syria and took control of Jarablus from ISIS 
in August 2016.23 In March 2017, Syrian fighters backed by the US began to close in on 
Raqqa and seized a main route near the city24 and the US will likely send 1,000 more 
ground troops ahead of the Raqqa offensive.25 Some ISIS leaders have fled Raqqa 
although an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 remain in the city to fight in an impending battle.26 
At its height, ISIS controlled nearly a third of Iraq; it has now lost more than half 
of its once-held territory in the country. In January 2016, Iraqi authorities recaptured the 
Western Iraq city of Ramadi. In late 2016, Iraqi and Kurdish Peshmerga forces with US-
led coalition airstrikes and military advisors started an offensive to retake Mosul, Iraq’s 
second-largest city. In February 2017 Iraqi forces reclaimed the eastern half of Mosul and 
western Mosul was completely surrounded.27 Losing Mosul will likely put an end to 
ISIS’s territorial ambitions in Iraq for the time being, but the fight for Mosul will likely 
be lengthy and destructive as ISIS has underground bunkers and stockpiles of food to last 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 "Best Map of Syrian Civil War - Live Map of Syria / Syria News," Syrian Civil War Map, Accessed 
March 24, 2017, http://syriancivilwarmap.com/. 
23 Lisa Barrington and Umit Bektas, "Turkish forces deepen push into Syria, draw U.S. rebuke over their 
target," Reuters, August 29, 2016, Accessed March 24, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-
crisis-syria-idUSKCN11305C 
24 Michael R. Gordon, "ISIS Leaders Are Fleeing Raqqa, U.S. Military Says," The New York Times, March 
08, 2017, Accessed March 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/middleeast/syria-raqqa-
isis.html. 
25 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, "U.S. military likely to send as many as 1,000 more ground troops into Syria 
ahead of Raqqa offensive, officials say," The Washington Post, March 15, 2017, Accessed March 24, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/03/15/u-s-military-probably-sending-as-many-
as-1000-more-ground-troops-into-syria-ahead-of-raqqa-offensive-officials-say/?utm_term=.1caf1e892094. 
26 Michael R. Gordon, "ISIS Leaders Are Fleeing Raqqa, U.S. Military Says," The New York Times, March 
08, 2017, Accessed March 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/middleeast/syria-raqqa-
isis.html. 
27 Associated Press, "Mosul's ISIS-held neighborhoods surrounded, official says," Fox News, March 13, 
2017, accessed March 24, 2017, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/03/13/mosuls-isis-held-
neighborhoods-surrounded-official-says.html. 
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for years in the city. The UN warned that the Mosul battle could displace another one 
million people.28 
Ideology and Tactics 
ISIS subscribes to a violent, hardline version of Salafi-jihadism.29 This concept 
combines an emphasis on the military exploits of the Salaf (the early generations of 
Muslims) with jihad, the idea that religiously-sanctioned warfare is an individual 
obligation incumbent upon all Muslims. This idea gives violence a divine imperative. 
Adherents to this belief have an exclusivist view that their approach to Islam is the only 
authentic one and use it to justify violence against other Muslims. Salafi-jihadism is the 
ideological foundation for ISIS and serves as the footing for its agenda and tactics.30  
Before 2015, the primary focus of ISIS was its geo-strategy of capturing territory 
in areas of the Middle East, especially Syria and Iraq, “cleansing” and controlling it, and 
then state-building within it according to the Salafi-jihadist and Wahhabi vision. 
Expansion was another key goal, achieved by attacking nearby enemies like al Qaeda’s 
Jabhat al-Nusra, Syrian revolutionary forces, the Assad regime, or the Iraqi 
government.31 
 The main ISIS strategy in its campaign for territory was the surprise attack, 
inflicting mass casualties and spreading fear before withdrawing. ISIS then waited for 
unfriendly locals or Iraqi forces to flee the designated area. The use of excessive violence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 "Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps," BBC News, January 20, 2017, Accessed March 
24, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034. 
29 Christopher M. Blanchard and Carla E. Humud, “The Islamic State and U.S. Policy,” Congressional 
Research Service, Cong. Rept. January 18, 2017. 
30 Rashid Dar and Shadi Hamid, "Islamism, Salafism, and jihadism: A primer | Brookings Institution," 
Brookings, July 28, 2016, accessed March 24, 2017, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/islamism-salafism-and-jihadism-a-primer/. 
31 Omar Ashour, "ISIS Terror Strategy in Europe," Middle East Institute, April 7, 2016, accessed March 24, 
2017, http://www.mei.edu/content/article/isis-terror-strategy-europe.	  
	   14 
was a strategic choice to drive the “undesirables” out of captured lands, providing a 
submissive population to make the holding phase less complicated.32 
 ISIS is massively outnumbered by the advancing coalition battling for Mosul, a 
90,000 strong force including Iraqi troops and Kurdish fighters. This is likely the last 
stand for ISIS in Iraq; it is prepared for fierce resistance against opposing forces. 
Accordingly, ISIS now relies on asymmetric warfare tactics to inflict damage on its 
opponents and terrorize civilians. Coalition forces approaching the city must navigate 
roads lined with IEDs and avoid booby traps set by ISIS in recaptured towns. Suicide 
attacks have become signature methods of ISIS. The group commonly detonates bombs 
using cars, trucks, and suicide vests. ISIS has launched surprise attacks in other parts of 
Iraq, like Kirkuk and Rutba, to distract coalition forces and tie up resources elsewhere.33    
 The campaign for territory is not the only occupation of ISIS. The group also 
attacks soft targets, not only in the Middle East (Baghdad and Kabul) but also in the 
West, especially Europe (Paris and Brussels). Soft targets are characterized as locations 
such as marketplaces or halls where people are densely concentrated, it is hard to secure, 
and difficult to protect. Hard targets, on the other hand, are major targets but highly 
secure.34 Hard targets, like military bases or large political conferences, are difficult to 
attack because of heightened security. Terrorists, including ISIS, often attack soft targets 
because of the difficulty of hitting hard targets.35 ISIS sometimes hits hard targets, such 
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as the 2016 “crude” chemical attack at a US base outside Qayyarah in Iraq.36 However, 
even if ISIS prefers attacking hard targets, there is a benefit in striking soft targets. 
Hitting soft targets creates the impression that an attack can happen anytime, anywhere. 
This impression spreads fear, and ISIS wants to be feared and thought powerful.  
After losing territory in Syria and Iraq, ISIS has seemingly compensated with a 
shift in focus to soft target attacks all over the world. The number of foreign fighters 
traveling to Syria and Iraq has decreased in accordance to the changing ISIS strategy.37 
ISIS initiated major attacks outside the Middle East, especially in Europe. Since October 
2014, ISIS affiliates and sympathizers have conducted no less than thirty alleged plots 
and terrorist attacks against Western citizens and interests, compared to two alleged plots 
and one attack before that date. ISIS leadership increasingly directs these attacks.38 ISIS 
propaganda has shifted its focus from legitimating ISIS rule and calling for Muslim 
migration into ISIS-controlled lands to inviting attacks on the West.      
US officials have expressed concern over the ISIS strategy to attack the West. 
CIA Director John Brennan stated that ISIS is planning more attacks against the West and 
has a large number of Western fighters who could launch the attacks. Brennan voiced that 
ISIS’s “foreign branches and global networks can help preserve its capacity for terrorism, 
regardless of events in Iraq and Syria,” adding that as “pressure mounts” on ISIS, “it will 
intensify its global terror campaign.” 39 He also expressed that ISIS is likely exploring 
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means for infiltrating the West, including refugee flows, smuggling routes, and legitimate 
methods of travel.40 FBI Director James Comey warned that Western countries are 
threatened by “hundreds of very, very dangerous people” that could emerge from Syria 
and Iraq, forming “a terrorist diaspora sometime in the next two to five years like we’ve 
never seen before.” 41 
Attacks on the West can be conducted in many different ways. Former Defense 
Secretary Ash Carter stated that ISIS leadership has broad range in directing external 
attacks: personally directing ISIS fighters returning to their countries of origin, 
facilitating those that are recruited and trained but not in in-person contact with ISIS, and 
inspiring those who are simply moved by the ISIS message.42  
Besides campaigns for territory and attacks, ISIS employs other tactics in 
accordance with its ideology. ISIS has regularly performed public executions and 
crucifixions beginning in 2004.43 These acts include, among many others, the beheadings 
of several Westerners, including American journalists, posted online in 2014.44 
Religious minorities in ISIS territory have faced expulsion, destruction or seizure 
of property, forced conversion, kidnapping, assault, sexual slavery, and death. ISIS 
classifies Jews and Christians as hostile parties to justify violence against them and ISIS 
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leaders often refer to their enemies as part of a Jewish and Crusader-led conspiracy 
against Islam.45  
ISIS is responsible for genocide against Yazidis in Iraq and Syria and Christians 
in Iraq, Syria, and Libya.46 Moreover, as many as 7,000 Yazidi women were taken 
captive by ISIS and exploited as sex slaves.47 According to a 2016 United Nations report, 
ISIS may be holding 3,500 people as slaves.48 
ISIS attacks are not confined to non-Muslims, however. The jihadist group has 
carried out acts of genocide against fellow Muslims, such as the killing of the 322 
members of Albu Minr tribe in Iraq.49 ISIS leaders describe many Muslims as idolaters or 
apostates to justify violence against them. For example, ISIS considers Muslims that 
support democratic governance to be idolaters for elevating man-made law rather than 
God’s law. The group is uncompromising in its condemnation and violence toward Shia 
and Alawites, whom ISIS considers apostates subject to death for their beliefs and 
practices.  
ISIS effectively uses social media to carry out its objectives. Starting with 2012’s 
The Clanging of the Swords, a video series that depicts combat and violent death to    
disseminate anti-Shi’a propaganda in Iraq, ISIS has used video and social media tools to 
spread its message globally. ISIS videos began depicting beheadings of Iraqi soldiers and 
Westerners alike, and the group used Twitter as a platform to spread propaganda; this 
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media strategy has continued since.50 Graphic material put online by ISIS is meant to 
inspire potential recruits and sympathizers and to create publicity. This notoriety 
produces feelings of strength and influence as well as fear; social media is therefore an 
integral strategy for ISIS.  
ISIS has used its influence to disrupt the networks of other terrorist groups 
worldwide, including Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. ISIS has sought to change the 
leadership of its ally Boko Haram and has encouraged defections from Al-Shabaab in 
order to attract Somali recruits to its own ranks.  
ISIS is especially involved in Somalia as of late. It has produced propaganda 
videos aimed at Somali viewers, claiming to be the only true defenders of Islam. While 
ISIS has had limited success in recruiting in Somalia, some leaders of Al-Shabaab have 
defected. These defectors have been forced to flee, often to Libya, or face arrest or death 
by the Al-Shabaab internal security network. Somali defectors to ISIS are predominantly 
in the region of Puntland and clashes have erupted there between the defectors and Al-
Shabaab. Elsewhere, ISIS has attracted Somali-American recruits from Minnesota to 
fight in Syria and Iraq who otherwise may have joined Al-Shabaab.51 ISIS will probably 
continue its practice of recruiting in Somalia, as the group sees an unstable, conflict-
ridden, mostly Sunni Muslim, state from which it can bolster its dwindling ranks.      
As the group is pushed out of Iraq and Syria, it seems to be moving toward 
volatile Somalia in an attempt to preserve its mission of building an Islamic caliphate. 
ISIS may also have trouble holding territory in Somalia, however, only increasing the 
likelihood that it escalates use of guerilla tactics and terrorist attacks to remain relevant.    	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In October 2016, ISIS captured Qandala, a Somalian port town on the Gulf of 
Aden. Qandala is the first major town ISIS captured in Somalia.52 Although the ideology 
of ISIS can be attractive to Islamists in Somalia, the group will have difficulties    
challenging the dominance of Al-Shabaab in the country. Somalia is challenging to 
administer for non-natives unfamiliar with local clan politics. In Somalia, there is great 
suspicion of foreigners and local trust is extremely important.53 The recent success of 
ISIS in Somalia may be due to the emergence of local Somali defectors from Al-Shabaab 
in ISIS leadership. A former recruiter and spokesman for Al-Shabaab reportedly led the 
ISIS faction that captured Qandala.54 Although ISIS was reportedly driven out of Qandala 
by Somali security forces in December 2016,55 its turn to Somalia signals a strategic shift.  
 Boko	  Haram	  
Boko Haram is an insurgent group originally based in northeast Nigeria.56 Its  
 
name is roughly translated “Western education is sacrilege.” The group promotes a form  
 
of Sunni Islamic fundamentalism that forbids Muslims from any political or social  
 
activity associated with Western society, such as voting in elections or receiving a secular  
 
education. The group desires to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria with strict Sharia  
 
law across the country.57 Estimated at 4,000 to 6,000 fighters,58 the group uses violent  	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tactics and commonly attacks civilians.59 One of the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, 
Boko Haram has killed an estimated 15,000 people60 and more than 2.5 million people 
have been displaced as a result of the violence.61 In 2013, the US State Department 
designated Boko Haram as a terrorist organization.62 In recent years, Boko Haram has 
lost approximately 30% of its fighters since the inception of a regional force to reclaim 
territory from the group.63 
Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in March 201564 and sought to rebrand 
itself as the Islamic State’s West African Province,65 though the group remains more 
popularly known by its original name.66 Boko Haram’s declared name change seemingly 
marked a shift in focus to expanding the group’s influence to other regions of Africa, like 
ISIS with its presence in different regions of the Middle East.  
Boko Haram sees the Nigerian government as illegitimate and overrun with  
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Western influence. It regards the Nigerian state as being run by non-believers. Based in 
the mostly Sunni Muslim north,67 Boko Haram opposes a perceived concentration of 
wealth in Nigeria among the political elite, chiefly in the southern, mostly Christian, part 
of the country. This divide between north and south Nigeria is one of the starkest 
historically, as the political, economic, and cultural differences have often produced 
violence. Nigeria is the richest country in West Africa, but one of the most violent.68 
The Nigerian government and military has long suffered from corruption and 
mismanagement. Nigerian armed forces and police have also reportedly carried out   
human rights abuses, especially since the rise of Boko Haram. The group often uses these 
abuses as an effective propaganda tool. Because of these grievances and its stated 
mission, Boko Haram wishes to overthrow the Nigerian government and seeks to target 
neighboring states to grow a fundamentalist Islamic state.69  
Structure  
 Boko Haram has a clear organizational structure based on a fluid number of cells 
and hierarchical layers. Abubakar Shekau is considered the leader. Like ISIS, its highest 
decision-making body is the Shura council, which commands the various cells.70 A 
splinter faction of Boko Haram known as Ansaru emerged in 2012. Ansaru was critical of 
Boko Haram’s killing of Nigerian Muslims. Thus, Ansaru primarily focuses its attacks 
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and kidnappings on foreigners. The State Department designated Ansaru as a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization in 2013.71    
Boko Haram apparently suffered from another internal power struggle in 2016. 
Shekau claims to remain the leader, but after Boko Haram allied with ISIS, ISIS 
appointed Abu Musab al-Barnawi to lead in August 2016. Today, it appears that Boko 
Haram is split between followers of Shekau and followers of al-Barnawi.72 
 Besides the core militants of Boko Haram who seemingly ascribe to violent 
Salafi-jihadism, the group appears to draw support from a broad class of followers, 
predominantly young men from the Lake Chad Basin region in Nigeria, Niger, and 
Cameroon.  
History and Status 
Boko Haram was formed in 2002 around the Islamic scholar Muhammad Yusuf. 
Osama bin Laden sent $3 million to Nigeria to help form the terrorist group, and Yusuf 
co-opted a local youth group at a university in Maiduguri, starting Boko Haram with the 
help of Al-Qaeda. From 2003 to 2009, Boko Haram grew its organization, recruiting poor 
Nigerians (especially children) and establishing political power. Yusuf developed close  
ties with politicians in northern Nigeria and became rich and influential.73 
In 2009, Boko Haram initiated an insurgency against the Nigerian state, killing 
800 people. Yusuf, as well as an estimated 700 members of Boko Haram, were killed,74 
but the group continued its insurgency. In 2011, Boko Haram started striking areas in 	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northern Nigeria, mostly government or Christian targets, and attacked the United 
Nations (UN) compound in Abuja.75 The group engaged in hit-and-run attacks in mostly 
urban areas until a state of emergency was declared in the Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe 
states in 2013. Nigeria’s military and police were able to push the group out of urban 
centers,76 but then Boko Haram overran smaller towns and came to control many rural 
areas in northeastern Nigeria.77 By early 2015, the Nigerian government lost between 40 
to 70% of Borno state and border areas by Cameroon to Boko Haram78 
After Boko Haram killed thousands and invaded neighboring countries, a multi-
national African force comprising the militaries of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon 
began operations to fight the jihadist group in 2015;79 these operations, most notably 
from Nigeria and Chad, has retaken much of Boko Haram’s self-described caliphate.80 
Slowly, the Nigerian military uprooted Boko Haram’s infrastructure in northern 
Nigeria. In March 2015, the Nigerian government took back the city of Gwoza, a major 
turning point.81 Although Nigerian forces regained large swaths of territory from the 
jihadist group, Boko Haram is still powerful in the region, even with the rival factions of 
Shekau and al-Barnawi competing for control of the group. Since July 2016, the armies 
of Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and Benin are operating new assaults on Boko 	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Haram. Several operations, mostly conducted through the Nigerian military, are liberated 
vast areas from the group.82 
Ideology and Tactics 
Like ISIS, Boko Haram subscribes to Salafi-jihadism. This explains Boko Haram 
attacks against fellow Muslims, as this belief provides justification for such actions. The 
group regularly attacks mosques, churches, and schools, killing civilians en masse. 
Attacks attributed to the group usually feature IEDs, car bombs, suicide bombs, and small 
arms.83 Often targeting “pro-Western” institutions like schools, Boko Haram wants to end 
the integration of their society with the West.84 Boko Haram’s leader publicly threatened 
to burn secular schools and kill their teachers, calling these schools a “plot against 
Islam.”85 The group’s attacks against schools prompted the closing of more than 2,000 
schools in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.86 
The kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls was not an outlier in terms of Boko 
Haram tactics. Boko Haram often kidnaps women and children, sometimes for ransom, 
and the group has abducted as many as 2,000 women and children since 2012. Boko 
Haram is also known to kidnap Christian women in northern Nigeria; some of these 
women were reportedly forced to convert to Islam and have been used as sex slaves.87  
Boko Haram also regularly forces captured women and girls to carry out their 
attacks, thus turning them into suicide bombers. In fact, Boko Haram has used at least 	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105 women and girls in suicide attacks since June 2014, and female bombers- many 
children under the age of eighteen- carried out 41 percent of all Boko Haram-related 
incidents in 2014.88 While young boys are sometimes used as suicide attackers, female 
bombers are ideal for Boko Haram. They are searched less thoroughly at security 
checkpoints and can easily conceal explosives under dresses or gowns.89 
Boko Haram attacks occur almost daily in northeastern Nigeria and are 
increasingly frequent in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The group initially focused on 
government targets like police stations, but it expanded targeting to civilians in schools, 
churches, mosques, markets, bars, and villages. Cell phone towers and media outlets have 
been attacked as well, likely for both tactical and ideological purposes. Furthermore, 
Boko Haram has assassinated local political leaders and moderate Muslim clerics.90 
Starting in 2002, as Boko Haram began to receive financial aid from al-Qaeda, the 
group mimicked al-Qaeda’s character extensively with a tactical focus on asymmetric 
attacks against government and civilian targets. Although similar to al-Qaeda in 
character, Boko Haram was notable for its narrow domestic focus. After Yusuf’s death in 
2009, many Boko Haram members went to Somalia to fight with Al-Shabaab or to the 
Sahara and Sahel91 to join al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In 2011, Boko 
Haram began to combine vehicle-borne IEDs with shock tactics, using explosions to 
draw out security forces, which are then ambushed with IEDs. These kinds of assaults 
originated in Afghanistan and Iraq and it is likely that Boko Haram learned the tactics 	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through its relationship with AQIM. Boko Haram’s 2011 bombing of the UN compound 
in Abuja, its first international target, was likely a favor to AQIM because of its global, 
anti-Western message.92 
In 2012, many Boko Haram fighters joined AQIM in northern Mali, fighting in 
the Mali Civil War. They came back to Nigeria with experience in guerilla warfare, 
leading to improved capabilities in raids and engagements with the Nigerian military.93 
Boko Haram seized tactical military vehicles from various Nigerian military bases,94 
boosting the group’s capacity to engage military actors.       
Boko Haram changed its focus in 2014 and moved toward a conventional 
offensive to seize and hold territory.95 As ISIS captured territories in Northern Iraq and 
declared a caliphate, it inspired Boko Haram to capture territory and declare a caliphate. 
Boko Haram activities increased across Nigeria and the group attempted to disrupt the 
scheduled national elections in 2015. At the same time, Boko Haram expanded into Chad 
and Cameroon.96 The group likely thought that expansion into neighboring countries 
would help to recruit young Muslims in the region. But, unlike ISIS, Boko Haram did not 
have a social media presence. Furthermore, the group was not bringing western fighters 
into the organization.97 	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Boko Haram’s strategy reverted to asymmetric warfare and is largely uniform in 
the wake of territorial losses, focused on bombing or ambushing crowded markets, places 
of worship, and bus stations in surprise strikes, largely against soft targets in northeastern 
Nigeria and northern Cameroon.98 Robin Sanders, a former US ambassador to Nigeria, 
has said that Boko Haram transitioned to tactics of assymetrical warfare like guerilla 
attacks, which she notes are similar in style to Al-Shabaab. Additionally, Sanders 
contended that Boko Haram’s tactical efforts were being driven by its connection to 
ISIS.99 
 It appears that Boko Haram views guerilla strikes as the best strategy moving 
forward. Now that the militant group no longer controls large swaths of territory, 
members see acts of terrorism such as suicide bombings and hit-and-run raids as the only 
way to ensure that their presence remains noticed in the region. The jihadist group has 
attacked camps for displaced people in northern Nigeria, aiming specifically to harm 
people that have escaped Boko Haram’s violence.100 As schools reopen, Boko Haram will 
probably target the institutions as they have in the past.101 
The new strategy could be particularly concerning because the shift from ruling 
territory to conducting surprise attacks makes the actions of Boko Haram more difficult 
to predict. Moreover, it is difficult to discern where the fighters are based, as the group 
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now appears to control or little or no territory.102 Although many attacks have occurred in 
northeast Nigeria, guerilla tactics have also shifted to other parts of Nigeria and 
neighboring countries.103 Attacks on different regions serve to distract military forces 
from the focus on northeast Nigeria and drain government resources elsewhere.     
Deadly infiltrations outside of Nigeria, including attacks in Niger and Chad, likely 
serve to weaken the security of adjacent countries so Boko Haram could overrun the 
areas and obtain control. The multinational offensive against Boko Haram, comprising 
the militaries of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin, has been largely successful 
in its goal to regain territory from the jihadist group, but the growing guerilla attacks and 
bombings have not been contained. Boko Haram’s change in strategy is particularly 
concerning for Nigeria as it attempts to rebuild the northeast region and ensure the safety 
of its citizens.   
Boko Haram’s behavior since losing its territory bears a striking resemblance to 
Al-Shabaab actions in Somalia. Al-Shabaab employed guerilla-fighting tactics after 
losing its own territory to multinational forces. Al-Shabaab changed tactics from 
campaign-style offense or defense to the sole aim of destabilizing the areas that were 
seized from the group.104 The use of surprise attacks has evidently been effective, as Al 
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Shabaab has retaken at least three towns from African Union forces since September 
2015.105 
 Seeing that Al-Shabaab experienced success with guerilla tactics in Somalia, 
Boko Haram probably has a similar goal to reclaim towns in Nigeria. The regular attacks 
serve to destabilize areas of Nigeria and provoke fear in the people. Because Boko Haram 
now appears to control little or no territory, guerilla tactics like suicide bombings and 
surprise ambushes are the only means to make its presence felt. Northern Nigeria is the 
focus of these attacks, as the group looks to destabilize the regions that were formerly 
under its control. Boko Haram’s ultimate goal is likely to recapture these areas amid the 
chaos of its destructive attacks, similar to Al-Shabaab in Somalia.             
In February 2016, the connection between Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab was 
established further when it was reported that Boko Haram militants were receiving 
specialized training from Al-Shabaab forces in Somalia. The Boko Haram military was 
taught weaponry building and suicide attack methodologies in Al-Shabaab training 
camps. The national security advisor to Somalia’s president also believes that operatives 
from both groups shared “tactical operational skills” and maintained “cyber and physical 
contact.” 106    
In November 2015, ISIS claimed responsibility online for the attacks in Paris, 
France that killed 130 people. In this statement, ISIS mentioned the “dream to reclaim the 
wilderness in the interior Nigeria,” before asserting a desire to take Rome, Paris, and 
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Andalusia.107 The mention of Nigeria stresses the importance of the alliance between the 
ISIS and Boko Haram.  
The attacks in Paris demonstrated that ISIS could conduct an extremely deadly 
operation in a Western city. These attacks in Paris seemingly encourage members of ISIS 
and its affiliates to damage and terrorize Western civilization, as evidenced by the many 
attacks in Europe in recent months. Boko Haram’s leader has issued direct threats against 
the United States, signaling an expanding focus toward the West for the group. The attack 
on the UN building in Abuja may be its only significant international target so far, and to 
date no American citizens are known to have been kidnapped or killed by Boko 
Haram,108 but the group’s alignment with ISIS may mean an increase in targeting the US 
and the West in the future.  
Boko Haram has seemingly validated its allegiance to ISIS by partnering in the 
fight for Libya. Boko Haram reportedly sent military equipment and 200 troops to Libya 
to bolster the ISIS forces fighting for control of the country.109 The allegiance and 
connections to ISIS seem to indicate a shared goal between the jihadist organizations. 
Just as ISIS established a caliphate in Iraq and Syria and desires to expand further,110 it 
seems that Boko Haram desires to control territory beyond Nigeria and into neighboring 
countries. This goal to expand is evidenced by the group’s wish to be called the Islamic 	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State in West Africa province,111 suggesting a claim to a continental region, rather than 
only Nigeria.      
Because it lacked the capacity to wage a transnational insurgency in West Africa, 
Boko Haram’s infrastructure fell apart when the countries it attacked joined together and 
committed to uproot the jihadist group with their military forces. Boko Haram turned to 
copying strategies used by ISIS: vigorous use of social media and production of 
execution videos.112 Going forward, Boko Haram will probably use these materials to 
create a perception of strength, even in the face of lost power and territorial control. 
Ultimately, Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance to ISIS and emulation of ISIS social 
media may prove most effective as a propaganda tool, increasing the profile of the group.       
 
Al-Shabaab 
 Al-Shabaab, translated “The Youth,” 113 is a jihadist militant group fighting for 
the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Somalia. Also known as Harakat al-
Shabaab al-Mujahideen or Al-Shabab, the group has links to al-Qaeda and is a US-
designated terrorist organization like the previous groups.114 Al-Shabaab emerged from 
the ashes of the Islamic Courts Union, a coalition of local Sharia courts that combined to 
briefly govern large swaths of Somalia.115 Al-Shabaab took over most of southern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 "Islamic State ties broaden Boko Haram threat," BBC News, October 2, 2015, accessed March 25, 2017, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34412956. 
112 Christopher Wall, "Boko Haram's History: Radical Islam in Nigeria," Ntrepid, accessed March 25, 2017, 
http://www.ntrepidcorp.com/timestream/boko-haram-history/. 
113 Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, "Al-Shabab," Council on Foreign Relations, March 13, 
2015, accessed March 25, 2017, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650.	  
114 Marina Koren, "American Strikes Against al-Shabaab," The Atlantic, March 07, 2016, accessed March 
25, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/03/somalia-al-shabaab/472647/. 
115 Clint Watts, "End Game: Al-Shabab as a Model for the Islamic State's Decline," World Politics Review, 
March 30, 2015, accessed March 25, 2017, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15418/end-game-
al-shabab-as-a-model-for-the-islamic-state-s-decline. 
	   32 
Somalia in 2006. Even after being defeated by Somali and Ethiopian forces in 2007, the 
group continued its insurgency and sustained control over certain areas. It became a 
formal Al Qaeda affiliate in 2012. 
Like Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al-Shabaab is successful partly because of deep and  
historical divides in Somalia. Antagonism toward government and outside authorities 
drive support or acquiescence of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in their respective 
countries. The apparent human rights abuses of the Nigerian military seemingly created 
resentment. These abuses include the reported indiscriminate killings of suspected Boko 
Haram members and other civilians who resided in Boko Haram stronghold areas. 
Similarly, Al-Shabaab’s substantial growth between 2006 and 2008 was likely primarily 
driven by the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian troops. This invasion instigated a rise in 
Somalian nationalism, leading to more Al-Shabaab membership.116 The group held 
considerable power over Mogadishu and important locations in the Somali countryside, 
but the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali Federal Government 
(SFG) military campaigns against the group weakened it. However, Al-Shabaab remains 
a threat to Somalia due to the volatile, war-torn nature of the state.117 
Structure  
Today, Al-Shabaab boasts between 7,000 and 9,000 troops. The group is 
successful in recruiting members from Western countries, including over 40 Americans, 
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mostly from California and Minnesota. Many of these recruits have been used on suicide 
missions.118 
Even though it has been pushed out of major urban areas, Al-Shabaab still 
controls and governs certain territories and controls thousands of square miles in 
Somalia. In the first form of Al-Shabaab government, regional and local administrations 
included offices for education, missionary propagation, taxation, the judiciary, and 
collection of religious charity and taxes. This type of governance is similar to that of ISIS 
in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Now, Al-Shabaab still operates many of these functions, but on 
a diminished scale.119 
History and Status 
 Since 2011, AMISOM-led forces have degraded Al-Shabaab’s control in key 
regions and major southern cities of Somalia, including Mogadishu, the country’s capital. 
Nevertheless, the group has remained resilient and adaptable, strong enough to act as a 
“shadow government” in Somalia.120 Despite internal divisions and shifting alliances in 
recent years, the group has carried out many attacks against government officials and 
AMISOM forces as well as military bases in Somalia. Since 2013, Al-Shabaab has also 
conducted operations in Kenya, such as the attack on the Westgate mall in Nairobi that 
killed at least 67 people and the attack on a Christian university in Garissa that killed 148 
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people. 121 The group has conducted attacks in other neighboring countries as well, like 
its suicide bombing of a restaurant popular with Westerners in Djibouti.122 
 In October 2014, Al-Shabaab lost control of Baraawe, its last major urban 
stronghold and access point to the Indian Ocean. Despite mounting pressure and lost 
territory, Al-Shabaab has remained resilient. After implementing guerilla tactics, the 
group retook several towns from AMISOM in 2015.123 These towns included Buqda, an 
economic center in the Hiran region, El Saliindi, south of Mogadishu, and Kuntuwarey, 
near Barawe.124 
 The leaders of Al-Shabaab desire to seize back territory from AMISOM and SFG. 
They also seek to publicly recapture villages and towns that government forces are 
unable or unwilling to protect. Al-Shabaab achieved a propaganda and tactical victory by 
temporarily taking back the cities of Merca and Afgooye. Even though the jihadist group 
was soon forced to withdraw from the areas, raising their flags in these locations created 
a perception of Al-Shabaab power.125 
 Al-Shabaab’s emir announced the intention to expand territorial control. He stated 
that Al-Shabaab still engages in social services, education, and judicial affairs. The 
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organization also declared it will continue to exercise governing authority and use 
violence to carry out that authority.126  
 Since August 2016, Al-Shabaab has killed a number of high-ranking Somali 
officials, including a senior intelligence officer, a district commissioner, and a general in 
the national army. Al-Shabaab continues to regularly attack the Somali capital of 
Mogadishu and AMISOM military bases.127 The group is enjoying its most successful 
run of attacks against the Somali government in years, just as the Somali electoral 
process is in a transition period with a new parliament and new president.128 But even as 
Al-Shabaab is expanding its attacks, the group itself is fairly unstable because of 
defections to ISIS, which has recently started operations in Somalia.129 
Ideology and Tactics 
Al-Shabaab, like Boko Haram and ISIS, believes in Salafi-jihadism. All three 
groups prescribe to Islamic fundamentalism and jihad. The Wahhabi movement, which 
promotes the establishment of Islamic caliphates governed by Sharia law, strongly 
influences the three groups. These guiding principles are successful rallying points in 
recruiting, organizing, and sustaining attacks on their countries’ governments and 
regional forces. While all the groups condemn the West, they differ slightly in perception 
of Westernization. Boko Haram and ISIS denounce all Western or modern education, 
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music, and literature (“the Quran is the only literature one should read”). Conversely, Al-
Shabaab does not condemn most Western technology or its characterization.130  
Starting in 2008, Al-Shabaab tightened its relationship with al Qaeda. The group 
shifted more closely to al Qaeda in ideology and tactics, emphasizing the struggle in 
Somalia as part of a global jihad. It began to align with al Qaeda in ideology and tactics, 
targeting civilians through suicide attacks much more frequently. Al-Shabaab leadership 
included al Qaeda members and attracted foreign fighters and donations from al Qaeda 
supporters. Al-Shabaab forces even trained abroad with al Qaeda.131 
Al-Shabaab’s decision to carry out major attacks on civilian targets marked a 
sharper focus on terrorism against soft targets. While it may look like the group is no 
longer interested in insurgency, soft target attacks are linked to Al-Shabaab’s evolving 
military strategy, as guerilla and surprise mass attacks on AMISOM and SFG are still 
often carried out.132 
Even as the group has shifted toward soft target attacks, Al-Shabaab military 
operations do not always target civilians. The group continues small-unit, hit-and-run 
attacks and thoroughly planned, coordinated assaults on AMISOM, SFG, and other 
opposing forces. After spectacular losses when telegraphing and launching mass frontline 
attacks on AMISOM and SFG positions, Al-Shabaab shifted to guerilla tactics. Since 
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then, the group usually employs lower-risk attacks, many involving IEDs, against 
opposition forces, checkpoints, camps, and along roads and supply routes.133 
After IEDs, the most common Al-Shabaab attacks include grenades and mortar 
fire and the use of snipers. The group often assassinates officials or members of 
AMISOM and SFG. Al-Shabaab targets police, journalists, peace activists, international 
aid workers, diplomats, and private citizens, and it engages in kidnappings and attacks on 
property. Additionally, Al-Shabaab suicide bombings escalated since 2008.134 This 
combination of attacks is meant to destabilize Somalia and prevent AMISOM and SFG 
from establishing peace in the country, therefore enabling Al-Shabaab to eventually 
reclaim territorial control amidst its created destruction.135 With this in mind, Al-Shabaab 
conducted direct strikes on AMISOM forward operating bases. The group overran bases 
in Leego, Janaale, and El Adde, and killed more than 170 soldiers.136 
 After Kenyan military forces entered the fight against Al-Shabaab, the jihadist 
group began carrying out deadly raids, ambushes, and bombings inside Kenya. Al-
Shabaab attacks on Westgate Mall in Nairobi and Garissa University College exemplify 
the group’s attempts to pressure the Kenyan government to withdraw its troops from 
Somalia by inflicting harm on Kenyan citizens and creating domestic instability.137      
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Al-Shabaab, like ISIS and Boko Haram, uses AK-47 rifles, automatic machine 
guns mounted on non-tactical vehicles, rocket propelled grenades, and vehicle-borne and 
person-borne improvised explosive devices to launch spontaneous attacks in different 
regions. Al-Shabaab perfected hostage-taking tactics: storming villages, cities, 
government buildings, or shopping malls, and it often carries out suicide bombings.138 
The group has also shown a new level of technological sophistication when it nearly 
brought down a commercial airliner with a bomb hidden in a laptop and through multiple 
massive car bomb attacks.139 
Al-Shabaab, like Boko Haram, has in recent years reverted to unpredicted 
killings, hit-and-run attacks, kidnappings, and bombings. These strategies serve to ensure 
that both groups remain a powerful presence in their respective regions and carry on the 
groups’ purposes and goals. Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram seek to root out the West in 
their regions and believe they are justified in doing whatever necessary to accomplish the 
task. Although both groups do not hold the territory or as much territory as they once did, 
their ideas of creating caliphates in their regions remain potent. It seems that their 
ultimate goal is to recapture territories amid the chaos of surprise attacks, looking to 
acquire enough land in the aftermath to establish a caliphate. Al-Shabaab was successful 
in recapturing some territories in 2015, displaying a desire to continue holding territory.    
The collapse of Yemen after the Saudi-led intervention reinvigorated Al-
Shabaab’s longtime ally, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). US intelligence 	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agents are convinced that AQAP was training Al-Shabaab fighters and sending them 
weapons and ammunition since 2011. Yemen’s breakdown led Al-Shabaab and AQAP to 
strengthen their ties, as the transfer of weapons and training between the two groups 
seemingly accelerated. The Somali Foreign Minister cites Al-Shabaab’s new 
technological sophistication as evidence of increased collaboration between the group 
and AQAP. Moreover, the gradual escalation of Al-Shabaab attacks since 2015 could 
partly reflect the ease of procuring weapons from AQAP in war-torn Yemen.140 
The campaign of attacks against the Somali government intensified in 2016 in the 
middle of the election season. Disrupting the electoral process is consistent with an old 
Al-Shabaab strategy of discrediting any competing sources of authority and legitimacy. 
At the same time, Al-Shabaab increased its attacks in northern Somalia, outside its 
normal southern area of operations; in August 2016 it carried out the deadliest terror 
attack ever in the northern region of Puntland, killing nearly 30 people through suicide 
bombings in Galkayo. By expanding north, Al-Shabaab has more space operate and 
decreases its chances of being squeezed completely out of Somalia, while also prompting 
Somali and AMISOM forces to expend resources and attention in wider areas. An 
increased presence in the north also seemingly makes association with AQAP even more 
likely in the future.141 
  Al-Shabaab, like ISIS, has benefitted from the chaos of the failing states in its 
region. This region has been battered by many years of continuous conflict and is home 
to many disenfranchised tribal communities. Al-Shabaab became powerful by harnessing 
the resentment of these disenfranchised communities. The group drew its leaders from 	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lesser tribal clans in Somalia, intervening on their behalf against dominant clans. By 
focusing on ideology as a vehicle for governance, Al-Shabaab was able to inspire trust 
from the lesser clans and move past traditional clan loyalties.  
 Al-Shabaab’s leaders have threatened attacks in the US and against US targets in 
the region, displaying an anti-American ideology at least somewhat similar to ISIS and 
Boko Haram. At least five US citizens have been killed in Al-Shabaab attacks in East 
Africa since 2010.142 The group’s ability to recruit abroad and attract foreign fighters, 
including some US citizens, also suggests an interest in global reach.  
 Like ISIS and Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab’s media tools are strong and effective, 
including video, audio, and text formats. It has local media capabilities within Somalia 
like domestic radio broadcasts. The group uses the media platforms to recruit regional 
foreign fighters, particularly Swahili-speakers, from around East Africa to Somalia. East 
Africans are prominently featured in the group’s propaganda videos; the group uses 
Swahili in its films, as well as Arabic and English. Al-Shabaab propaganda highlights 
discrimination from African governments, including claims that Kenyan Muslims are 
being persecuted.143 
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Implications 
 ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab each have roots in al Qaeda but are 
independent from the organization. The groups certainly have a similar worldview as al 
Qaeda, which is also grounded in global Salafi-jihad and guerilla attacks. Like al Qaeda, 
the groups carry out attacks with conventional weapons and explosives, and perpetrators 
often commit suicide in the acts. They strike against opposing militaries and civilians 
alike. Like al Qaeda, each group is ideologically opposed to the West, although to 
different degrees. ISIS frequently attacks Western targets; Boko Haram’s main ideology 
is opposition to the West; and Al-Shabaab embraces Western inventions more openly. 
The aversion to the West partially explains the groups’ hatred toward the governments of 
their respective countries, which the groups perceive as pro-Western. ISIS, Boko Haram, 
and Al-Shabaab each use antipathy toward local governments to create support for 
themselves and encourage attacks against government forces.     
 The difference between these groups and al Qaeda is the central, short-term goal 
of establishing their own governments with a strict interpretation of Sharia law and, in the 
case of ISIS, creating an Islamic caliphate; al Qaeda also desires a caliphate, but sees it as 
a long-term goal and instead focuses on high-profile attacks.144 Each group succeeded in 
acquiring territories in their respective homelands or even further, such as the ISIS moves 
into Syria and Libya. They all also lost significant amounts or all of their territories after 
military defeats. Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab have turned to guerilla tactics and suicide 
bombings, seeking to destabilize and eventually retake lost areas. In the early aftermath 
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of losing large swaths of land, ISIS is conducting attacks similar in a nature to Boko 
Haram and Al-Shabaab.    
These jihadist groups seemingly inspire each other and feed off each other’s 
tactics and successes. In addition to coordination and mutual support in some cases, they 
model each other’s activities at given times. For example, now that ISIS and Boko Haram 
are allies, Boko Haram has clearly modeled its current social media and execution videos 
from ISIS. And while Al-Shabaab and ISIS are enemies, their fighting strategies are 
similar and the groups likely look to each other for tactical improvements or new 
strategies.   
ISIS is following a trajectory similar to the other two groups, as it is starting to 
engage in more guerilla attacks and suicide bombings in Syria and Iraq. It is possible that 
using these tactics is the natural next step, maybe the only option to ensure that its 
presence remains in the region and continue to be perceived as a strong force to be 
feared. But it also seems that ISIS is purposefully following the examples of Boko Haram 
and Al-Shabaab. This is especially apparent in the ISIS strategy of randomly attacking 
disparate areas of Iraq to confuse the enemy, as Boko Haram has followed the same plan 
in its respective region. It is likely that the shift in ISIS tactics is due to a sense that the 
change is both necessary to survive under its new constraints and also a purposeful 
imitation of the somewhat successful tactics of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab.     
 ISIS is likely preparing for the long and treacherous insurgency in Iraq. General 
Joseph L. Votel, the commander of American forces in the Middle East, said that ISIS is 
increasingly fighting less like a conventional army and more like a terrorist force. ISIS 
has doubled its use of suicide bombers and ambushes to attack Iraqi security forces.  The 
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2016 ISIS attack in Baghdad, which killed 330 people, foreshadowed a tactical change.145 
Surprise attacks and bombings can be an effective tool in spreading fear and chaos and 
ultimately destabilizing an area. Al-Shabaab recaptured towns from Somali government 
forces precisely because it destabilized the areas with guerilla tactics. Boko Haram is 
attempting the same method in Nigeria. ISIS will likely increase its use of surprise 
attacks, especially if or when it loses control of Mosul. The group will likely follow the 
examples of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, relentlessly attacking formerly controlled 
areas until the area is destabilized and ISIS can reclaim it. The idea of establishing 
Islamic caliphates is powerful for these groups, as the Wahhabi movement motivates 
each of them; it is not likely that any of the groups will give up on the aspiration.     
 At the same time, ISIS has a larger global presence than Boko Haram and Al-
Shabaab. ISIS will undoubtedly continue to attack the West, and Europe in particular. 
These attacks strike at the fears of Westerners, and ISIS desires to be perceived as a grave 
threat to Western civilization. The recent ISIS capture of a town in Somalia also signals 
another possible change in strategy. Even as ISIS will probably not give up on Iraq and 
will remain in Syria, the group may attempt to take over areas that are more feasibly 
overpowered; Somalia is a good target because of its instability, although conflict with 
Al-Shabaab seems inevitable. ISIS may be on a down spiral in Iraq, but the group will 
likely shift to insurgency as a tactic to one day taking back control, increasing guerilla 
tactics globally, and seeking other unstable regions in the Middle East as possible new 
homes. If anything is certain, ISIS will not go down without a fight, and its prevailing use 
of guerilla tactics will make it even more difficult to defeat.   	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Part 2: US Counterterrorism Policies 
After analyzing the organizations and tactics of ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-
Shabaab and discussing implications in Part 1, the second part to this study focuses on 
how the US government is meeting the challenges presented by these groups and offers 
potential best practices in confronting the groups in the future. Part 2 does not analyze US 
policies toward al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in countries like Afghanistan and 
Yemen, but focuses on the groups from Part 1 because of their aforementioned desire to 
control territory and similar tactics. Furthermore, this study does not analyze the amount 
of money spent on military actions or humanitarian aid to victims of these groups, but 
follows the specific US objectives, policies, and results against these groups. 
Part 2 first analyzes the counterterrorism policies toward ISIS, Boko Haram, and 
Al-Shabaab during the Obama Administration. This study then offers an analysis of 
President Obama’s policies against the groups, looking at whether objectives were met, 
policies were successful, and if some criticisms were valid. Part 2 then looks at policies 
of the Trump Administration toward ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al Shabaab. Since much of 
President Trump’s counterterrorism policies have yet to be enacted, this section mostly 
analyzes statements of US officials and new reports on potential policies. It will be some 
time before Trump’s strategy and departures from the previous administration’s policies 
against these groups become clear, but this study does speculate on new approaches. 
Finally, Part 2 analyzes the problems presented by all three groups, predicts how the 
Trump administration may respond, and offers potential best practices in confronting the 
groups. 
 
	   45 
Obama Administration Policies 
 
ISIS 
Objectives 
 President Obama and the leaders of the anti-ISIS coalition of countries often 
expressed their goal to “degrade and ultimately defeat” ISIS by curtailing its territory, 
manpower, and finances.146  The stated objectives of the US policy against ISIS under the 
Obama Administration included narrowing the group’s hold on its core areas of control in 
Iraq and Syria, preventing additional support from affiliates and foreign fighters, and 
expanding efforts to thwart ISIS supported-and-inspired attacks outside of ISIS-held 
territory. The US military strategy under President Obama aimed to disrupt the ability of 
ISIS to operate freely within and between Iraq and Syria and to eventually isolate and 
recapture ISIS strongholds in Mosul, Iraq and Raqqa, Syria. Additionally, the 
administration’s overarching strategy was predicated on the principle of working by, 
with, and through US-supported local partners as an alternative to large-scale, direct 
applications of US force in the region.147     
 The Obama Administration’s objectives consisted of several lines of effort 
including alliances with European and Arab states, support for Iraqi government and 
Syrian rebel ground forces, intelligence gathering and sharing, efforts to restrict the flow 
of foreign fighters, obstruction of ISIS finances, and elimination of its leaders.148  
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 President Obama consistently argued that either drastically increasing or 
decreasing US and coalition military pressure on ISIS could serve the interests of ISIS, 
stating that a massive surge in troops would do little to alter the conditions that facilitated 
the rise of the group. After ISIS claimed responsibility for several terrorist attacks in 
Western countries, President Obama restated his judgment that deploying large-scale US 
ground forces for combat was not necessary to achieve US objectives. Rather, he argued 
that the US policies already in place, supporting local partners, were sufficient to achieve 
the administration’s objectives.149    
Policies  
 The armed offensive of ISIS across Iraq and Syria in 2014 prompted a US  
 
response; multiple US troops were deployed to Iraq to provide security to diplomatic  
 
personnel and facilities, advise Iraqi security forces, and gather intelligence.150 In the  
 
fall of 2014, the US began a campaign of targeted airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq and in  
 
Syria; additional countries joined the US in an international coalition to defeat the  
 
group.151 The US military operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria became known as  
 
Operation INHERENT RESOLVE.152 In 2015, President Obama ordered new  
 
deployments to Iraq and a small deployment of special operations forces to Syria to  
 
advise allied armed forces but also to perform unilateral US operations. In 2016, US  
 
military operations and deployments in the campaign against ISIS expanded further.153  
 
As of March 19, 2017, 6,000 US troops were in Iraq and Syria and about one-third were  	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special operators, many of whom were advising local troops and militias on the front  
 
lines.154   
 
As of March 14, 2017, US and coalition forces have conducted approximately  
 
11,356 and 7,592 strikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, respectively. US and partner- 
 
nation aircraft have flown approximately 143,510 sorties in support of operations in Iraq  
 
and Syria since 2014.155 US strikes support the defensive and offensive military  
 
operations of Iraqi military and Kurdish forces in Iraq and seek to erode the remaining  
 
territory of ISIS in Syria. Specifically, US strikes and Special Forces operations support  
 
local militaries in efforts to recapture Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria.156 US strikes are  
 
also targeting ISIS oil production infrastructure and cash stores.157   
 
 About two thirds of the US military personnel deployed to Iraq are trainers for the  
 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Kurdish peshmerga; the rest support these local forces  
 
and protect US personnel in Iraq. As of December 2016, the force management level for  
 
the US military in Iraq was 5,262, though US forces in Iraq may exceed that number  
 
periodically. US officials reported that more than 65,000 Iraqi personnel had received  
 
training, including ISF, Kurdish peshmerga, police, and Sunni tribal fighters.158  
 
 In October 2015, after it was revealed that the program to train and equip  
 
vetted Syrians in the fight against ISIS had yielded only four or five fighters, the Obama  
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administration altered its approach.159 The administration described the overhauled 
 
program as transactional and performance-based and it shifted away from training and  
 
equipping New Syrian Force units. Instead, it focused on equipping and enabling a select  
 
group of vetted leaders and their units fighting ISIS under a Kurdish-Arab coalition force  
 
known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria and under a force known  
 
as the New Syrian Army (NSA) in southeast Syria. Equipment including weaponry and  
 
ammunition are provided to SDF and NSA forces, and US Special Operations personnel  
 
deployed in Syria are advising and assisting the SDF in anti-ISIS operations.160   
 
 The US military’s Operation ODYSSEY LIGHTNING has conducted a campaign 
of airstrikes against ISIS in Libya and assisted local militia forces in recapturing territory 
from ISIS. Small numbers of US military personnel were also deployed to gather 
intelligence and build relationships with local anti-ISIS groups. In late 2015, the US 
military conducted an airstrike that presumably killed the Iraqi leader of ISIS operations 
in Libya, the first such airstrike on ISIS operatives outside of Syria and Iraq. A February 
2016 US strike on the western Libyan town of Sabratha targeted an ISIS camp and killed 
dozens of ISIS fighters.161  
Results 
 The coalition partners and the US are positive that they have succeeded in 
escalating military pressure on ISIS. In Syria, ISIS fighters have lost territory in the 
northeast to Kurdish and Arab forces backed by US airstrikes. US and Turkish-backed 
local forces have cut off ISIS’s access to the Turkish border and pushed ISIS fighters out 	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of a significant enclave in northwest Syria. Furthermore, US-backed Syrian rebels have 
advanced southward, progressing in a campaign to eventually retake Raqqa from ISIS. 
ISIS is resurgent in central Syria, however, where Syrian government and Russian forces 
withdrew from Palmyra to focus on Aleppo, creating a vacuum for the group.162    
 In Iraq, ISIS fighters have suffered losses to Iraqi forces in Tikrit, Baiji, Sinjar, 
Ramadi, Hit, Haditha, Rutbah, Fallujah, and other surrounding areas. US-backed Iraqi 
forces isolated Mosul in early 2017, with ISIS reduced to controlling the western half of 
Mosul and isolated areas of Salahuddin, Ninawa, and Anbar Provinces.163    
In Libya, the U.S. military’s Operation ODYSSEY LIGHTNING has facilitated 
ISIS losses in and around Sirte since mid-2016. The strength of ISIS in the country may 
be waning and the sustainability of its future operations there is uncertain. In another 
possible sign of declining power in Libya, ISIS members who sought to impose their will 
on the eastern city of Darnah faced resistance from other armed Islamist groups that do 
not recognize Baghdadi’s leadership.164 So, ISIS legitimacy in the country is seemingly in 
question.    
  Looking specifically at the Obama Administration’s stated objectives, results of 
the policies against ISIS are mixed. The US has continued its reliance on working with 
local forces and small operations instead of large-scale applications of US military force, 
a key objective. ISIS forces have experienced significant attrition and lost vast amounts 
of territory in Iraq and Syria since 2014,165 but still maintain much of their core domains. 
The campaigns for Mosul and Raqqa, though, are ostensibly heading in the right 
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direction. The number of foreign fighters traveling to Iraq and Syria to join the group has 
declined sharply. ISIS is also having difficulties meeting expenses due to coalition 
airstrikes eroding its oil production and cash stockpiles and as a result of the global drop 
in oil prices.166 At the same time, ISIS has intensified its campaign of planning, 
executing, and inspiring terrorist attacks outside of Iraq and Syria.167  
   
Boko Haram 
Objectives 
 In the aftermath of Boko Haram’s abduction of 270 schoolgirls in Chibok, the 
Obama administration announced in 2014 that it would help the Nigerian government 
find and free the girls and broadly combat Boko Haram in partnership with Nigeria, its 
neighboring countries, and other allies. The stated singular goal of policy in Nigeria was 
to dismantle Boko Haram. Objectives included advisory support to the Nigerian 
government, isolation of Boko Haram leaders, continued engagement to counter Boko 
Haram, and support to populations affected by Boko Haram.168   
 Humanitarian impact, assessments of direct threats, US interests, and US-Nigeria 
relations have guided US strategy toward the group. The Obama Administration saw 
Boko Haram as a local but potential regional threat to West Africa. AFRICOM’s theater 
campaign plan for 2016-2020 includes containing Boko Haram among its five planned 
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“lines of effort.”169 According to the State Department, the primary goal of US assistance 
in Nigeria is to support the development of a stable democracy and reduce extreme 
poverty.170  
Policies 
 While the US has concentrated most its energies on ISIS in Iraq and Syria, recent 
policies have stretched further. The Obama Administration considered groups and 
individuals associated with ISIS and engaged in hostilities against the US and or its 
coalition partners to be legitimate military targets. One of those groups is Boko Haram, or 
ISIS in West Africa Province. Since 2014, US counterterrorism assistance to Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Chad, and Niger has grown substantially and the Lake Chad Basin region 
became a priority of US Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) programs.171 Nigeria 
receives peacekeeping support through the State Department’s African Contingency 
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, and receives counterterrorism, 
anticorruption, and maritime security assistance through the West Africa Regional 
Security Initiative (WARSI).172   
In 2014, the US dispatched a team to Abuja, Nigeria to advise locals on how to 
secure the safe return of the kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls, to encourage an exhaustive    
approach in addressing vulnerabilities, and to establish capacities to respond more 
effectively to Boko Haram. This team offered guidance to the Nigerian government on 
protecting civilians and respecting human rights in the response to Boko Haram attacks.    	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The US also provided Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to aid 
the endeavor to find the kidnapped girls,173 deploying approximately 80 US military 
personnel and surveillance aircraft to Chad to monitor Boko Haram activity in this 
effort.174 That specific mission reportedly ended in late 2014,175 but the US Air Force still 
flies surveillance drones from small bases in Niger and Cameroon to keep Boko Haram 
activity under surveillance.176   
The Obama Administration sought programs to improve counterterrorism 
coordination between Nigeria and its neighbors and to improve each country’s ability to 
suppress Boko Haram.177 Accordingly, the State and Defense Departments created a 
Global Security Contingency Fund for Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to counter 
the jihadist group. This program provides technical expertise, training, and equipment to 
the four countries to develop capabilities in fighting Boko Haram and lays the 
groundwork for increased cross-border cooperation in this fight.178  
Niger is the largest recipient of US security assistance in the region and US 
assistance to Cameroon and Chad increased substantially in recent years.179 400 US 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 "FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government in its Fight against Boko Haram," The 
White House: President Barack Obama, October 14, 2014, accessed March 26, 2017, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/14/fact-sheet-us-efforts-assist-nigerian-
government-its-fight-against-boko-. 
174 Lauren Ploch Blanchard and Tomas F. Husted, “Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,” 
Congressional Research Service, Cong. Rept. March 11, 2016. 
175 Lauren Ploch Blanchard, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions,” Congressional 
Research Service, Cong. Rept. March 29, 2016. 
176 Eric Schmitt, "Trump Continues U.S. Use of Special Forces, Keeping Wars at Arm’s Length," The New 
York Times, March 19, 2017, accessed March 26, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/world/africa/trump-special-forces-navy-seals.html. 
177 Lauren Ploch Blanchard, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions,” Congressional 
Research Service, Cong. Rept. March 29, 2016. 
178 "FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government in its Fight against Boko Haram," The 
White House: President Barack Obama, October 14, 2014, accessed March 26, 2017, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/14/fact-sheet-us-efforts-assist-nigerian-
government-its-fight-against-boko-. 
179 Lauren Ploch Blanchard, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions,” Congressional 
Research Service, Cong. Rept. March 29, 2016.	  
	   53 
troops are stationed in Niger and the US is building a $50 million drone base in Agadez  
to monitor Boko Haram insurgents.180 President Obama sent roughly 300 US troops and 
surveillance drones to Cameroon to provide ISR support in a noncombat operation. 
Around 40 US troops are also in Chad to assist in the campaign against Boko Haram. 
Counterterrorism assistance to Nigeria’s military has been comparatively small because 
of Nigerian soldiers’ apparent human rights violations.181  
Reports of serious abuses by Nigerian government forces have constrained greater 
US support and counterterrorism collaboration in the past. US legal provisions prohibit 
assistance to foreign security forces implicated in human rights violations, impairing US-
Nigeria security cooperation. US Defense officials have also described Nigeria as an 
“extremely challenging partner” and “slow to adapt with new strategies, new doctrines, 
and new tactics.” 182  
 The State Department reported that Nigerian security forces, partly in response to 
Boko Haram, engaged in extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, arbitrary detention, 
mistreatment of detainees, and destruction of property. Amnesty International reported 
that Nigerian military forces have extra-judicially executed more than 1,000 people and 
arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000 people; at least 7,000 people have died in military 
detention from starvation, overcrowding, and denial of medical assistance.183   
The State Department also announced that Nigeria has government-supported 
armed groups that recruit or use child soldiers. Nevertheless, President Obama waived the 	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application of restrictions on foreign aid established under the Child Soldier Prevention 
Act of 2008 and the State Department cleared more than 1,000 members of the Nigerian 
security forces and hundreds of military and police units for US assistance.184    
US officials have not ignored the reported abuses, however. When former 
Secretary of State John Kerry visited Nigeria in 2013, he stated, “One person’s atrocity 
does not excuse another’s.” 185 Nigerian officials regard US accusations of human rights 
abuses as interference in internal affairs and have been dismissive of certain US 
counterterrorism training offers at times. These factors strained the relationship between 
Nigerian security branches and US defense officials, as evidenced when Nigeria 
suspended US Special Forces advanced infantry training for an elite Nigerian army unit 
in 2014.186 
 A US Defense official indicated that the US military is “exceedingly cautious” 
when sharing information with Nigerian security forces because of their “unfortunate 
record” and have pursued assurances from Nigeria that shared US intelligence would be 
used “in a manner consistent” with human rights law.187 This caution prompted the 
decision to block Israel’s sale of US-manufactured Cobra helicopters to Nigeria in 
2014.188  
Former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari was elected president of Nigeria in 
2015, marking the country’s first peaceful, democratic transfer of power. The Obama 
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Administration had a relatively favorable view of President Buhari, seeing that his steps 
to address security abuses went further than those of the previous Nigerian president, 
Goodluck Jonathan.189  In an example of improved relations, the US donated 24 Mine-
Resistant-Armor-Protected vehicles to Nigeria’s military forces in 2016.190  
  The US was instrumental in the UN action to prohibit arms sales to Boko Haram 
and freeze its assets. The US designation of Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO) triggers the freezing of any assets the group might have in US 
financial institutions, bans group members’ travel to the US, and criminalizes 
transactions with the organization or its members.191  
Results   
 Even though Boko Haram suffered extensive losses to several governments’ 
armed forces in the Lake Chad region and has been deprived of much of its former 
territory, the group remains a significant threat in West Africa. It continues to carry out 
asymmetric attacks against civilians, from ambushes to suicide bombings. A UN official 
related that a military approach would not bring an end to Boko Haram, stressing that 
affected countries must tackle the root causes of extremism.192  
 Boko Haram is facing significant financial difficulties according to UN officials. 
Boko Haram’s monetary resources are drained and the internal power struggle within the 
group is exacerbating the problem.193 However, these difficulties do not appear to be the 
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result of UN sanctions or the US FTO designation, which had no discernable effect on 
Boko Haram due to the group’s informal structure.194 The extent to which the group 
raises funds from abroad is unclear. Boko Haram seemingly funds its operations through 
bank robberies, kidnapping for ransom, assassinations for hire, and other criminal 
activities. The group also seized considerable amounts of Nigerian military equipment 
and ammunition in 2014 and 2015 and is suspected of selling stolen cattle.  
 There has been some progress in the objective to free the kidnapped Chibok 
schoolgirls, one of the main goals of the Obama Administration’s Nigeria policy. In 
October 2016, Boko Haram freed 21 of the kidnapped girls following mediation with 
Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). But, as of 
December 2016, an estimated 195 girls were still in captivity.195 Talks to free the rest of 
the girls are ongoing, but recent negotiations only involved 83 of them.196  
 Few of the Obama administration’s objectives against Boko Haram have been 
met. First, Boko Haram has not been dismantled up to this point. It has lost much of its 
territory, but its attacks are as prevalent as ever. While the US has offered some advisory 
support to Nigeria, it has not provided as much to the country as it has to Nigeria’s 
neighbors (for a plethora of, apparently good and wise, reasons). Of the kidnapped 
Chibok schoolgirls, nearly 200 remain captive. That said, the peaceful transfer of power 
in Nigeria from one presidential administration to another in 2015 was a first for the 
country and a promising step for the durability of its democracy.    	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Al-Shabaab 
Objectives 
 The primary US interest in Somalia is to prevent the country from becoming a 
refuge for terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab to plot attacks against the US and further 
destabilize the Horn of Africa.197 The overarching strategy under President Obama was to 
support policies and reforms in Somalia aimed to eliminate underlying sources of 
violence and increase regional stability. A key US objective has been supporting the 
Somali National Army and AMISOM in their efforts to push Al-Shabaab out of its 
strongholds.198  
Policies 
 Hitherto, Al-Shabaab has been a greater concern for US officials than Boko 
Haram because of evidence that Al-Shabaab has effectively recruited US citizens into its 
ranks. As a result, the US has been directly engaged in efforts to defeat the group.199 
Since 2007, the US has trained and equipped AMISOM forces battling Al-Shabaab. The 
US has also conducted drone strikes and special operations raids on Al-Shabaab targets. 
In an approach called offshore balancing, the US employs air and sea assets in the region 
in support of local counterinsurgency forces in Somalia including AMISOM. To develop 
a diplomatic presence in Somalia, the US formally recognized the Somali government in 
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2013 after a twenty-year hiatus. In 2015, President Obama nominated the first US 
ambassador to Somalia since 1991.200       
 The only permanent US military installation in Africa is Camp Lemonnier in 
Djibouti. The base comprises 4,000 US service members and civilians and operates as a 
hub for counterterrorism campaigns and training.201 A makeshift base in Baledogle, 
Somalia is also used to train a Somali military unit to fight Al-Shabaab.202  
In 2016, the US escalated its military involvement against Al-Shabaab in Somalia; 
200 to 300 US Special Operations troops carried out more than a half-dozen raids per 
month with the help of soldiers from Somalia and other African nations. These operations 
combined ground raids and drone strikes; the US Navy’s Seal Team 6 was heavily 
involved in many of the raids. American troops are also working with Somali forces to 
interrogate Al-Shabaab fighters after completing ground operations.203      
The Obama Administration loosened the legal scope of the war against Al Qaeda, 
deeming Al-Shabaab to be part of the armed conflict that Congress authorized against the 
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. The move shores up the legal basis for the intensifying 
campaign of airstrikes and counterterrorism operations in Somalia.204    
The Treasury Department also attempted to economically starve Al-Shabaab 
through several sanctions against Somalia. Private financial institutions are suspending 	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money transfers from the US to Somalia in an effort to prevent American money from 
reaching Al-Shabaab.205     
Results 
 US drone strikes and US financial and material assistance to a 22,000-strong 
AMISOM force have succeeded in driving Al-Shabaab from most urban areas,206 yet the 
group remains the most significant threat to peace and security in Somalia and the Horn 
of Africa.207 Regional security is in constant flux due to Al-Shabaab attacks and suicide 
bombings on civilians, Somali government, and AMISOM targets.208  
 US airstrikes against Al-Shabaab have a varied record. Some strikes have been 
decidedly successful. A March 2016 strike, one of the deadliest in any country in recent 
years, killed more than 150 Al-Shabaab fighters in what US military officials called a 
graduation ceremony. A September 2016 strike, however, killed more than a dozen 
Somali government soldiers. Somali officials were outraged and stated that the US was 
duped by Somali clan rivals and given bad intelligence.209  
 There are countless complexities of waging war against Al-Shabaab. US allies 
have struggled to sustain success against the group, largely due to internal rifts and clan-
based politics in the region. Many of Kenya’s counterterrorism policies have been 	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counterproductive, as the Kenyan government has rounded up masses of Somali 
immigrants and refugees. Entire communities in the country have been made scapegoats 
for Al-Shabaab actions. Accusations of corruption, torture, and extrajudicial killings by 
Kenyan government forces are widespread. These reported abuses have slowed US 
counterterrorism training and assistance to Kenya through the Security Governance 
Initiative just as similar abuses inhibited US support to Nigeria in the effort against Boko 
Haram.210 
 Meanwhile, AMISOM efforts have been hindered by the difficulties of training 
Somali national forces, still torn by clan rivalries. Counterterrorism assistance through 
US airstrikes and special operations have interfered with Al-Shabaab operations, but the 
balance of power on the ground remains unchanged. AMISOM forces are largely    
confined to their bases, and many roads in Somalia are still controlled by Al-Shabaab. 
The group’s deadly attacks on AMISOM bases in the last two years have slowed 
AMISOM-Somali offensives.211 Even in cities where AMISOM is nominally in control, 
its forces rarely conduct active patrolling or anti-Al Shabaab operations. Rarely are there 
any “holding and building” efforts in AMISOM-run cities. Moreover, coordination, 
intelligence sharing, and joint planning between AMISOM forces in Somalia is 
uncommon.212   
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 Stig Jarle Hansen, an Al Shabaab expert and research fellow at the Belfer Center 
for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, is pessimistic on the results 
of US policy against Al-Shabaab, saying, “It’s not only the US failing to defeat Al 
Shabaab, it’s actually the US failing to defeat almost any jihadi group in Africa…” 213 
 Criticisms aside, some objectives in US policies against Al-Shabaab were met 
under President Obama. US-backed AMISOM and Somali forces have pushed Al-
Shabaab out of many areas of Somalia. Additionally, Al-Shabaab has not plotted and 
carried out an attack in the US, although the group has killed US citizens abroad. Still, 
the Horn of Africa is an extremely unstable region, partly due to Al-Shabaab, and the 
underlying causes of violence and conflict in the region have not been neutralized. While 
Al-Shabaab has been forced out of many cities in Somalia, it still controls vast areas in 
the country and continually plagues populated areas with deadly attacks.  
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Analysis of Obama Administration Policies 
 In terms of merely meeting counterterrorism policy objectives, the Obama 
Administration had a mixed record. In anti-ISIS policy, objectives were met fairly 
successfully, albeit the rise of ISIS terrorist attacks against the West and around the 
world. Objectives were not met as often in Africa, where Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab 
continue to thrive despite lost territory and increased US involvement in the fights against 
the groups. Since meeting objectives is only one criteria of success, one should consider 
whether President Obama implemented the proper strategy, proclaimed reasonable goals, 
and understood certain assumptions or underlying premises in totality.     
 The Obama Administration’s strategy in counterterrorism efforts against ISIS, 
Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab was largely built around “sustainable efforts.”214 This 
involved building the capacity of partners, placing multi-directional military pressure on 
opposition fighters, addressing regional and local political disputes, and avoiding possible 
costly and counterproductive military interventions.215 President Obama’s strategy was 
ostensibly constructed with the perceived excesses of the previous administration’s 
invasion and occupation of Iraq in mind. In avoiding similar policies, the Obama 
administration clearly sought to refrain from large-scale US troop commitments or 
massive investments in theaters of combat. Instead, the administration usually focused on 
supporting local forces through means of airstrikes and small groups of special operators.    
 Certain critics of Obama’s policies, like James F. Jeffrey,216 Matthew Levitt,217 
and Michael Morell218 argued that the US should increase the use of military force and 
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prioritize defeating ISIS in response to its continuous terrorist acts. They generally 
believed that greater direct military commitment than the Obama Administration was 
willing to provide was necessary to ultimately defeat these groups.219      
 Near the end of Obama’s final term, the US military stepped up its fight against 
ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab. This acceleration was likely necessary to protect 
national security interests, and while it may not have featured a drastic increase in 
military force, it was a slight departure from earlier strategy. The US began implementing 
more military power against ISIS with airstrikes and arming and training of local forces, 
quite costly investments. The fights against Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab involved US 
military force on a much smaller scale, but nonetheless US involvement in efforts against 
both groups accelerated substantially since 2015.       
Some critics still argued that the administration’s reported caps in troop levels and 
strict limits on combat hampered more immediate outcomes in these fights, but generally 
supported the move toward increased military involvement in these conflicts. Whether 
the Obama Administration felt more investments were simply necessary or realized some 
validity in those critics’ arguments for more muscular policies is unclear, but changes 
were enacted. These changes, at the very least, weakened the three groups (especially 
ISIS) and pushed them out of many areas. Those developments made the ultimate goal of 
defeating all the groups seem attainable and now ground offensives against the groups are 
trending in a positive direction.  	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But while many developments in these fights are favorable, terrorist attacks 
carried out by these groups are rampant. ISIS soft target attacks in Europe became 
increasingly common in recent years and US citizens have been killed in ISIS-inspired 
attacks on US soil. These attacks have led some to call for an even stronger response to 
ISIS and a substantial increase in US troops in Iraq and Syria. President Obama stated 
that a large increase in US military presence would do little to alter the political and 
security conditions that give rise to such attacks. However, some charge that Obama’s 
underlying assumptions were wrong, and that a massive US operation to destroy ISIS 
would not only nullify the group’s fighters and areas of control, but also deter future 
terrorist attacks because the rallying cry and great cause of ISIS or ISIS-inspired terrorists 
(the caliphate) would no longer exist.220  
Other critics of Obama’s approach believe that US policy toward ISIS, Boko 
Haram, and Al-Shabaab should look toward containment, not defeat. They view the goal 
of ultimately defeating these groups as unreasonable considering partner capabilities and 
the current will of the US public regarding Middle East conflicts. They also think that the 
linkage between the amount of territory of a terrorist group and the number of attacks 
carried out by the group is tenuous. Last, critics of a military driven approach argue that 
operations to defeat ISIS do little to undermine its ideology and may even strengthen its 
appeal by fulfilling ISIS predictions.221      
In Part 1 of this study, it was concluded that when these groups lose territory, they 
often respond with asymmetric tactics and soft target attacks. So, there might indeed be 
some linkage between controlled territory and terrorist attacks. It is possible that these 	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groups respond in a way opposite to conventional thinking and even to the thinking of 
certain critics’; for these groups, less territory may correspond to more terrorist attacks.   
Therefore, it is not likely that an accelerated US surge against the groups will   
deter terrorist attacks, as some critics of the Obama Administration’s strategy believe, at 
least in the short-term. And if there is more than a tenuous link in the other direction 
between territory and terrorist attacks, advocates of a containment strategy may conclude 
that this makes their approach even more advantageous than if the link did not exist. The 
US would probably be ill advised to implement a less vigorous strategy against these 
groups, however. While depriving ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab of territory will 
not deter guerilla tactics in the short-term, the US is likely best served to maintain its goal 
of ultimately defeating the groups in the long-term. This means continued targeting of the 
leaders and fighters of these groups and eroding their core centers of operations. After all, 
in the post-2003 occupation of Iraq, the US military suffered mightily from insurgents’ 
brutal ambushes and bombings. The US sustained operations in Iraq, fighting insurgents 
and developing security, and attacks decreased significantly by the time the US withdrew 
armed forces from the country in 2011.222      
 In order to fully debilitate the functions of these groups, a larger US military 
presence in the fights against them is probably essential. Nonetheless, there are no simple 
solutions in dismantling the operations of the groups. As seen in the campaigns against 
Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, even if the groups are pushed out of territory and defeated 
in conventional warfare, they just revert to guerilla tactics, which are difficult to hamper 
even for a large, capable security force. Hesitation on the part of the Obama 	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Administration to vastly expand US military force against these groups was presumably a 
cautious attempt to avoid committing to protracted fights similar to the post-2003 
occupation of Iraq. Although such fights involve great expense and sacrifice for the US, 
in the long-term it is likely in US national security interests to suppress these groups in 
order that they not metastasize and conquer more territory, making them even greater 
geopolitical threats. These considerations may have contributed to the Obama 
Administration’s refashioned strategy starting in 2014.         
Ultimately, while the Obama Administration seemingly desired a departure from 
the previous administration’s policies, factors on the ground prompted a stronger 
approach to ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al Shabbab than was being pursued earlier in 
Obama’s presidency. The realities and complexities of the War on Terror caught up to the 
administration, and in its final years it implemented a fairly strong military approach 
toward these groups. President Obama preserved the strategy of focusing on assisting 
local forces and limiting US troop levels, but operations against the three groups still 
ended up a costly endeavor. The Obama Administration’s approach succeeded in 
thwarting the progress and largely isolating the operations of ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-
Shabaab, but the asymmetric tactics enacted by all three groups in response has created 
an entirely new set of problems.       
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Trump Administration Policies 
 
ISIS 
 President Trump has signaled that his administration may reexamine and redefine 
US strategies toward ISIS with a goal of defeating ISIS quickly and decisively. During 
his nomination hearing, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson described defeating ISIS as “the 
most urgent step in thwarting radical Islam,” adding, “defeating ISIS must be our 
foremost priority in the Middle East.”223 Press reports suggest that elements of the State 
Department may be reorganized to focus more on counterterrorism and combatting 
violent Islamist extremism. Secretary Tillerson also recognized that defeating ISIS 
globally will be “extremely challenging” and that depriving the group of its “caliphate” 
will not totally defeat ISIS but that the group will “simply morph into its next version.”224 
More direct and accelerated US military operations against ISIS are distinct possibilities 
under the Trump Administration.     
 In February 2016, Defense Secretary James Mattis delivered a plan to the White 
House on how to accelerate the fight against ISIS. This plan likely involves an increase in 
US troops in Syria and strategies to constrict ISIS funding; Secretary Mattis has publicly 
stated a desire to accelerate the capture of Raqqa.225 A Pentagon official indicated that the 
plan is “global” and looks beyond Iraq and Syria.226    
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 The planned deployment of 1,000 more US troops into northern Syria to aid the 
Raqqa offensive would potentially double the number of US forces in Syria, if approved. 
Along with this move, the Trump Administration is likely planning to officially abolish 
the troop caps that were in place for the US military under President Obama. The 
previous administration capped the number of troops at 5,000 in Iraq and 500 in Syria. 
Speaking about the potential cap removal, a US defense official stated that “military 
doctrine promotes agility, and it would help us respond as conditions dictate.”227  
 While many US military officials embrace reductions of combat operation limits 
against ISIS, a more unimpeded approach carries risks. Since Trump took office, there 
are some allegations that US airstrikes are resulting in an alarming amount of civilian 
casualties in Iraq and Syria. On March 17, 2017, the US launched an airstrike against 
ISIS at the request of Iraqi forces in a densely populated neighborhood in Mosul; 
residents of this neighborhood claim that a strike on that day killed 137 civilians. The US 
military is investigating the incident, but if the strike did result in the death of that many 
people, it would mark the greatest loss of civilian life in a single strike since US 
operations against ISIS started in 2014. The US military is also investigating a separate 
strike alleged to have killed civilians at a mosque in Syria.228  
US officials maintain that so far no changes to existing rules for military 
operations have been enacted under Trump. While this potential rise in civilian casualties 
may be the result of ISIS fighters’ increasing use of human shield tactics (placing 	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civilians with them to deter strikes at their location), it may still undermine the US and its 
partner forces’ relations with civilians.229 Even if limits on combat have not changed, 
there is now an appearance of less caution in these matters.      
 
Boko Haram 
 Before Donald Trump’s inauguration as US President, his transition team 
submitted a four-page list of questions concerning US policy in Africa to the State 
Department. This list indicated possible skepticism about US counterterrorism policy on 
the continent and raised questions about the perpetuation of aid programs. Specifically, 
this document asked why the US cares to be involved in the fight against Boko Haram in 
Nigeria and why all the kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls had not been rescued.230  
 In early February, President Trump had a discussion with Nigerian President 
Muhammadu Buhari over the phone and conveyed America’s continued support in the 
struggle against Boko Haram.231 Trump reportedly promised to “cut a new deal” to sell 
more weapons to Nigeria and praised the “strides being taken by the Nigerian 
military.”232  
 The Trump Administration’s aggressive stance on terrorism has been well 
received in Chad, where government forces fighting Boko Haram appreciate US 
assistance in the effort to degrade the group. In March, US Special Operators and military 	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instructors from multiple Western countries conducted a three-week counterterrorism 
exercise in Chad to train African troops. Soldiers and security forces in Chad, Nigeria, 
Niger, and Cameroon largely welcome the US presence in the fight against Boko Haram, 
and many want to see an even larger US military force to help combat the threat.233   
 
Al Shabaab 
 The Trump presidential transition team’s list of questions to the State Department 
also inquired about the effectiveness of the counterterrorism effort in Somalia. The 
document asks, “We’ve been fighting al-Shabaab for over a decade, why haven’t we 
won?”234 
 Monde Muyangwa, the director of the Africa program at the Woodrow Wilson 
Institute, noted that “the framing of some of their questions suggests…  a more 
transactional and short-term approach to policy and engagement with African countries,” 
and that the queries could signal a “dramatic turn” in US policy in Africa.235   
 J. Peter Pham, director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council and rumored 
as a possible Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs in the Trump Administration, 
expects at least some stability in relations with Africa and thinks that President Trump 
will focus on fighting extremism in Africa.236 Similarly, Al-Shabaab expert Stig Jarle 
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Hansen does not expect President Trump to pull the US out of Somalia, but thinks that 
Trump is likely to focus more on training local security forces to eradicate Al-Shabaab.237  
 As of March 19, 2017, President Trump is expected to soon approve a Defense 
Department proposal to remove constraints on Special Operations airstrikes and raids in 
Somalia to target Al-Shabaab militants. Trump Administration officials show no signs of 
reversing Obama’s strategy to train, equip, and support local armies and security forces in 
this fight. This probably means, like under President Obama, a considerable reliance on 
Special Operations forces without the political and economic risks of large-ground wars, 
although Trump is signaling more latitude to the Pentagon in terms of troop levels. 
Considering the Trump Administration’s proposed deep budgetary cuts to foreign aid and 
the State Department,238 it means that Special Operations will still be one of the main 
instruments in projecting overseas power, even as Trump prioritizes a defense buildup.  
 As far as diplomatic relations are concerned, President Trump’s revised executive 
order placing a 120-day ban on all refugees and a 90-day ban from six mainly Muslim 
nations, including Somalia, created quite a stir. Somalia’s president, Mohamed Abdullahi 
Mohamed, a dual US-Somali citizen, said, “we have to talk about what the Somali people 
have contributed rather than a few people who may cause a problem.”239 Increased US 
involvement in the fight against Al-Shabaab, however, may have the potential to mitigate 
rifts created by the travel ban.    
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Current Challenges and the US Response 
 Although President Trump often sounded radical and militaristic when stating his 
plan to crush ISIS during the 2016 presidential campaign, he could very well end up 
following counterterrorism policies quite similar to his predecessor. Trump clearly has no 
issues with projecting a muscular military strategy, but, as a harsh critic of the Iraq War 
policies under President George W. Bush, he also admonishes supposed military 
adventurism abroad. If Trump indeed prioritizes smaller investments and fewer 
footprints, it seems entirely possible that the new administration will continue many of 
Obama’s counterterrorism policies, albeit with more emphasis on explicit military 
actions.    
The earliest reports of the Trump administration policies in this area seemingly 
reveal a reliance on Special Operations forces to intensify the campaigns against ISIS and 
other terrorist groups even as senior officials partly embrace Obama’s strategy to 
minimize the US military’s presence abroad. The president’s first counterterrorism 
mission was the SEAL Team 6 raid against Al Qaeda in Yemen in which Navy SEAL 
Ryan Owens was killed.240 The raid was example of reliance on Special Operations, 
likely to remain a theme in the foreseeable future.     
At the same time, President Trump will likely look to remove many of the 
constraints on military operations in place during Obama’s presidency. This could mean a 
possible change in the rules of warfare against ISIS and the removal of caps on troop 
levels in Iraq and Syria. In fact, it has been reported that a few thousand more 
conventional troops may eventually be sent to Iraq and Syria.  	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A more muscular and unrestricted approach to ISIS may have its drawbacks, 
however. US officials have stated that the Trump Administration has not changed the 
rules of warfare against ISIS as of yet, but the alleged upsurge in civilian casualties 
resulting from US airstrikes have already created an impression of heedlessness. The 
appearance of a new, brash airstrike policy- valid or not- threatens to undermine the new 
administration’s strategies even before enactment.   
President Trump has inherited a counterterrorism policy that succeeded in its 
efforts in some ways but also had its holes. Many acknowledge that ISIS, Boko Haram, 
and Al-Shabaab have all been weakened in at least some way, whether in territory or 
capacity or recruiting. But while the groups were weakened in certain conventional 
capabilities, all three turned to asymmetric tactics and soft target attacks. Seeing that 
Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab were able to use guerilla warfare to disrupt their respective 
countries and bring about unstable environments for governments attempting to 
consolidate control of retaken areas, it is likely that ISIS will use similar strategies as 
local forces begin the process of governing former ISIS-controlled areas.    
Of the campaigns against ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab, the battle 
countering ISIS has the largest scale, as it is a focal point of US military operations and 
receives much attention from media and casual observers. Besides the far-reaching nature 
of the anti-ISIS offensive, the fight will present a formidable challenge in future years. 
Even as the US and local partners have seized the military initiative on several fronts, the 
conflict against ISIS will likely be lengthy, costly, and complex. ISIS’s global appeal and 
its committed fanatics are still grave threats to international security. The Trump 
Administration is reportedly looking to increase troop levels in Iraq and Syria to 
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accelerate the removal of ISIS from Mosul and Raqqa,241 but even if the new 
administration is successful of depleting ISIS of much of its territory, new issues will 
arise in the effort against the group. 
The involvement of Russia, Iran, Turkey, and several of the Arab states in Syria 
adds to the complexities of the strategies and policies against ISIS. The introduction of 
Russian military force in support of the Assad regime constricts US combat options 
because the US now has to deal with another airpower in a combat zone. The US military 
has been forced to improve communication with the Russian military in Syria to avoid 
mishaps between the separate air campaigns. Although the US and Russia ostensibly 
share the same goal of defeating ISIS, Russia’s backing of the Assad government 
complicates relations as Russia has reportedly targeted rebel groups with at least tacit US 
support in its airstrike campaigns.   
Iranian military forces and Iran-backed Hezbollah also entered the Syrian conflict 
in support of Assad, spreading influence even after the US attempted to ameliorate 
relations and curb Iran’s nuclear weapons development with the 2015 nuclear agreement. 
Turkey, broadly a US ally in the anti-ISIS fight, is antagonistic towards Kurdish military 
forces in northern Syria due to historic hostilities. The Arab states involved in Syria are 
generally supportive of the US-led coalition against ISIS and hostile toward the Assad 
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regime and Iran, although it appears that some are backing hardline Islamist rebel groups 
that are too extreme and similar to ISIS for the US to support.242 
The Iraqi government’s involvement with other powers in the campaign against 
ISIS also complicates the US role in Syria and Iraq. Military officials in Iraq have stated 
that they are cooperating with Russia and Iran regarding intelligence and security 
operations.243 A potential alliance between Iraq, Russia, and Iran has detrimental 
consequences for the US because it means that two generally anti-American powers are 
building their spheres of influence in the Middle East, hindering US strategy in the 
region, and strengthening ties with Iraq after the US has gone to great lengths for the state 
to remain a friend and ally.   
Iraq’s bolstered ties to Russia and Iran could worsen relations with the US, which 
is relying on Iraq to be an accountable partner in the fight against ISIS. A deteriorating 
bond would only exacerbate the difficulties of countering ISIS in Iraq. Iraqi forces 
already may be susceptible to divisions amongst themselves if they experience setbacks, 
and if US influence wanes, it will be nearly impossible to create order and follow through 
a successful anti-ISIS campaign. Discord within the Iraqi military and between the US 
and Iraq could create openings for ISIS to exploit, as the state is still torn by religious and 
ethnic animosity between different groups. 244       
Besides other powers frustrating US strategy against ISIS, the tactics of the group 
itself will encumber US policies. Part 1 of this study concluded that ISIS will likely turn 	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to asymmetric tactics after losing its territory in Iraq and Syria. Upticks in ISIS attacks in 
the West and globally, as well as early signs of this tactic in the Middle East, provide 
evidence for such a change. As ISIS changes its strategy, though, the US will have to 
respond in a purposeful way to confront the group and change its own military strategy.   
 After ISIS is forced out of its areas of control, US and local forces in Iraq and 
Syria will have to adapt to new policies if they want to consolidate the areas retaken from 
ISIS. This will likely mean a focus on security and surveillance in these areas as ISIS 
turns to guerilla attacks and bombings to disrupt its former territories and attempt to 
create enough instability to eventually move back in. The group will continue to fight for 
territory because of its firm belief in creating an Islamic caliphate. While it may seem like 
an irrational strategy for ISIS, it has worked at times for Boko Haram and especially for 
Al-Shabaab.  
 While the threats of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab are less severe and the fights 
against them have a smaller scale, the obstacles to ultimately defeating these groups are 
significant and abundant. To defeat Boko Haram, the US will likely have to address the 
resource constraints (exacerbated by corruption) of Nigerian security forces and fill the 
training gaps that slow its effort against the militant group; that struggle will not likely 
end soon.245 Moreover, even though President Trump promised a new weapons deal for 
Nigeria, any such deal will bring about controversy due to the country’s reported human 
rights abuses. The Trump Administration does not seem to prioritize humanitarian issues 
as much as the previous administration, but the US will likely look for an explicit attempt 
by Nigeria to reform its practices before reaching a major new weapons deal.  	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The factors on the ground in Somalia and concerning Al-Shabaab may be the 
most complex of all three counterterrorism efforts. For one, politics in Somalia continue 
to be clan-based and cutthroat.246 The emergence of ISIS in Somalia and the reemergence 
of AQAP as a major terrorist group in the region further complicate US strategy in the 
region. The US may still increase military pressure on Al-Shabaab, and the revamped 
military strategies against the group enacted near the end of Obama’s final term will 
almost certainly continue under President Trump.          
US limited targeted airstrikes had minimal impact on Al-Shabaab for a long 
period. The group has been quick to regroup and retaliate with attacks on soft targets, so 
the US slightly changed its strategy. US airstrikes have recently targeted not just small 
groups of Al-Shabaab leaders, but its training bases. By targeting these facilities, US and 
AMISOM forces may be trying to hinder Al-Shabaab’s ability to fight instead of just 
eliminating operational leadership. This type of targeting, because of its apparent success, 
will likely continue. And with Al-Shabaab currently dealing with	  internal	  divisions	  due 
to defections to ISIS, the Pentagon may look to widen attacks on the group.247 
 In regards to the overall US military strategy against Boko Haram and Al-
Shabaab, there is still much to do in order to create stable environments in Nigeria and 
Somalia. In the past, local forces did not have the correct strategies or the capacity to 
fight off these groups after taking control of former terrorist-controlled areas. 
Government forces in Nigeria and Somalia suffered from a lack of coordination, 
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intelligence sharing, and planning after making gains against Boko Haram and Al-
Shabaab. Patrols in retaken areas and sustained operations against the terrorist groups 
were uncommon, as these forces only understood conventional warfare tactics.248     
The introduction of US Special Operations forces has improved the capabilities of 
local forces to respond to the asymmetric tactics of these groups, especially in 
coordination and intelligence sharing, but consolidating retaken areas will ultimately 
mean not only understanding counter-insurgency techniques, but likely a significant 
investment of manpower to “hold and build” these areas.249 Seeing that Nigerian, Somali, 
and AMISOM forces have a limited capacity, another boost in US troop presence in 
Nigeria and Somalia may be necessary at some point during the Trump presidency.   
 Similarly, if local forces in Iraq and Syria want to “hold and build” newly retaken 
areas from ISIS, they will have to implement counter-insurgency strategies involving 
patrols, intelligence gathering, and continual operations against ISIS.250 Also, like the 
situations in Nigeria and Somalia, local forces may not have the capacity to fully sustain 
these kinds of strategies. The US has already indicated that it will increase US troops to 
defeat ISIS, but when it comes to consolidating areas gained back, it will take 
considerable effort and political will on the part of the US to maintain its troops on the 
ground in the long-term, especially once ISIS is pushed out of its remaining territories.  
As seen during the Iraq War, such long-term operations can become complex, 
controversial, and unpopular. President Trump himself has been critical of the Iraq War 
policies and may possibly look for a quick exit from Iraq and Syria once ISIS is squeezed 	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out of its controlled-areas. However, such an exit might create a similar situation to the 
one that gave rise to ISIS in the first place. Although local forces seem more equipped to 
better handle the conflict than at times in the past, they may not have the capacity to keep 
up counter-insurgency efforts alone. Sustained US power in these regions may be the 
only option to continue to suppress ISIS and other groups. Ultimately, US military 
officials will likely push for continued operations in Iraq and Syria, even after pressing 
ISIS out of its territory, because of the military’s apparent institutional awareness of the 
consequences of withdrawal and lessons coming out of the Iraq War.   
 Even if US forces stay in Iraq and Syria long-term, it will be difficult to deter ISIS 
attacks and protect soft targets at home and abroad. The Trump Administration stresses 
protecting national security and has implemented a temporary travel ban on six majority-
Muslim countries and a temporary ban on refugees.251 This policy was enacted with the 
proposed goal of safeguarding the homeland, but it also created widespread confusion 
and backlash. Such issues will not likely go away during Trump’s term, as the 
administration’s policies on securing the US will at times conflict with the values of some 
people. These kinds of debates are occurring in Europe as well, as the difficulty of 
balancing security and liberal values become apparent.    
While depriving ISIS of its so-called caliphate may curtail the morale of its 
fighters and inspired fanatics, it is not clear that it will mean fewer attacks. As discussed 
earlier, it may even mean more attacks. ISIS may see high-profile attacks as the only way 
to remain relevant and continue targeting the West to galvanize its supporters.  
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There are significant issues in the effort against jihadist terrorism that are difficult 
to reconcile with public policy. Radicalization of young people, even in the West, is a 
recurring and remarkable phenomenon. To ultimately defeat groups like ISIS, Boko 
Haram, and Al-Shabaab, it may be necessary to confront the ideology that unites them. 
But reversing such an ideological movement will likely take decades and even centuries. 
US government policies can bring about change on the ground against these groups, but 
other social and religious movements will likely have to occur before the ideology itself 
loses its appeal, and that kind of action is seemingly out of the US government’s purview.  
The Trump Administration is signaling a robust military commitment to defeating 
Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, and especially ISIS; US counterterrorism policies of this era 
will likely be defined by increased numbers of troops to fight these groups overseas and 
then confronting the following asymmetric attacks with counter-insurgency methods. 
While President Trump may not desire to continue operations against these groups in 
Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, and Somalia in the long-term, it will probably be necessary. For if 
the US loses interest these fights and withdraws, these countries will stand little chance 
against the jihadist groups clamoring for another opportunity to cultivate their own 
extremist, barbarous states.   
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